S Sc co op pe e a an nd d S Su ur rv vi iv va al l: : A A C Co om mp pa ar ri is so on n o of f C Co oo op pe er ra at ti iv ve e a an nd d C Ca ap pi it ta al li is st t M Mo od de es s o of f P Pr ro od du uc ct ti io on n" " N Na at tá ál li ia a P Pi im me en nt ta a M Mo on nt te ei ir ro o G Ge eo of ff f S St te ew wa ar rt t NIPE WP 08/ 2013 " "S Sc ca al le e, , S Sc co op pe e a an nd d S Su ur rv vi iv va al l: : A A C Co om mp pa ar ri is so on n o of f C Co oo op pe er ra at ti iv ve e a an nd d C Ca ap pi it ta al li is st t M Mo od de es s o of f P Pr ro od du uc ct ti io on n" " N Na at tá ál li ia a P Pi im me en nt ta a M Mo on nt te ei ir ro o G Ge eo of ff f S St te ew wa ar rt t Abstract This paper draws on a comprehensive data set from Portugal to investigate the activities, internal characteristics and survival prospects of cooperatives and capitalist enterprises. Consistent with theory, high levels of market concentration and low entrycosts were shown to be conducive to cooperatives. Cooperatives were found to be, on average, older and to operate with a larger, more highly educated and more productive labour forces than their capitalist counterparts. Finally, we show that cooperatives have a markedly higher probability of survival than capitalist enterprises, even after controlling for industry and …rm characteristics. JEL Classi…cation: J54, P12 1 1 See, for example, Baker and Hubbard (2004) on the impact of computers on the ownership of assets in the trucking industry, Hart and Moore (1996) on changes in the ownership of securities exchanges and Morrison and Wilhelm (2008) on the demise of partnerships in investment banking. 2 Whilst we are not aware of a formal theoretical model linking cooperative activity to levels of interpersonal trust, Jones and Kalmi (2009) cite a number of papers that provide arguments suggesting the existence of such a link. 3 Recent comparative studies involving worker cooperatives include Arando et al. (2012), Pérotin (2006) and Podivinsky and Stewart (2012).

In many countries wages are set in two stages, where industry-level collective bargaining is followed by firmspecific arrangements determining actual paid wages as a mark-up on the industry wage floor. What explains the wage set in each of these stages? In this paper we show that both the industry wage floor and the average wage cushion are systematically associated with the degree of firm heterogeneity in the industry: The former (latter) is negatively (positively) associated with the productivity spread. Furthermore, since the response of the wage floor dominates that of the wage cushion, workers in more heterogeneous industries tend to get lower actual paid wages. These conclusions are reached in a model of Cournot oligopoly with firm productivity heterogeneity and a two-tiered wage setting system. They are then confirmed by administrative data covering virtually all workers, firms and collective bargaining agreements of the Portuguese private sector for the period 1991-2000.

In many countries wages are set in two stages, where industry-level collective bargaining is followed by …rm-speci…c arrangements determining actual paid wages as a markup on the industry wage ‡oor. What explains the wage set in each of these stages? In this paper we show that both the industry wage ‡oor and the average wage cushion are systematically associated with the degree of …rm heterogeneity in the industry: The former (latter) is negatively (positively) associated with the productivity spread. Furthermore, since the response of the wage ‡oor dominates that of the wage cushion, workers in more heterogeneous industries tend to get lower actual paid wages. These conclusions are reached in a model of Cournot oligopoly with …rm productivity heterogeneity and a two-tiered wage setting system. They are then con…rmed by administrative data covering virtually all workers, …rms and collective bargaining agreements of the Portuguese private sector for the period 1991-2000.

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