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This paper documents that strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the past and sell stocks that have performed poorly in the past generate significant positive returns over 3‐to 12‐month holding periods. We find that the profitability of these strategies are not due to their systematic risk or to delayed stock price reactions to common factors. However, part of the abnormal returns generated in the first year after portfolio formation dissipates in the following two years. A similar pattern of returns around the earnings announcements of past winners and losers is also documented.

This paper evaluates various explanations for the profitability of momentum strategies documented in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The evidence indicates that momentum profits have continued in the 1990's suggesting that the original results were not a product of data snooping bias. The paper also examines the predictions of recent behavioral models that propose that momentum profits are due to delayed overreactions which are eventually reversed. Our evidence provides support for the behavioral models, but this support should be tempered with caution. Although we find no evidence of significant return reversals in the 2 to 3 years following the following formation date, there are significant return reversals 4 to 5 years after the formation date. Our analysis of posthiding period returns sharply rejects a claim in the literature that the observed momentum profits can be explained completely by the cross-sectional dispersion in expected returns.

This paper presents new empirical evidence of predictability of individual stock returns. The negative first‐order serial correlation in monthly stock returns is highly significant. Furthermore, significant positive serial correlation is found at longer lags, and the twelve‐month serial correlation is particularly strong. Using the observed systematic behavior of stock returns, one‐step‐ahead return forecasts are made and ten portfolios are formed from the forecasts. The difference between the abnormal returns on the extreme decile portfolios over the period 1934–1987 is 2.49 percent per month.

We examine whether the predictability of future returns from past returns is due to the market's underreaction to information, in particular to past earnings news. Past return and past earnings surprise each predict large drifts in future returns after controlling for the other. Market risk, size, and book–to–market effects do not explain the drifts. There is little evidence of subsequent reversals in the returns of stocks with high price and earnings momentum. Security analysts' earnings forecasts also respond sluggishly to past news, especially in the case of stocks with the worst past performance. The results suggest a market that responds only gradually to new information.

We show that analysts from sell-side firms generally recommend "glamour" (i.e., positive momentum, high growth, high volume, and relatively expensive) stocks. Naïve adherence to these recommendations can be costly, because the level of the consensus recommendation adds value only among stocks with favorable quantitative characteristics (i.e., value stocks and positive momentum stocks). In fact, among stocks with unfavorable quantitative characteristics, higher consensus recommendations are associated with worse subsequent returns. In contrast, we find that the quarterly change in consensus recommendations is a robust return predictor that appears to contain information orthogonal to a large range of other predictive variables.FINANCIAL RESEARCHERS AND PRACTITIONERS have long been interested in understanding how the activities of financial analysts affect capital market efficiency. Currently in the United States, over 3,000 analysts work for more than 350 sellside investment firms. 1 These analysts produce corporate earnings forecasts, write reports on individual companies, provide industry and sector analyses, and issue stock recommendations. Most prior studies have concluded that the information they produce promotes market efficiency by helping investors to more accurately value companies. 2The Journal of Finance about the intrinsic stock values relative to their current market prices, and finally rate the investment potential of each stock. As Elton, Gruber, and Grossman (1986, p. 699) observe, their stock recommendations represent "one of the few cases in evaluating information content where the forecaster is recommending a clear and unequivocal course of action rather than producing an estimate of a number, the interpretation of which is up to the user." In short, these recommendations offer a unique opportunity to study analyst judgment and preferences across large samples of stocks.Our study investigates the source of the investment value provided by analyst stock recommendations and changes in recommendations. One possible source of this value is the ability of analysts to collect and process firm-specific information useful in identifying undervalued or overvalued stocks. Alternatively, it is possible that analyst recommendations derive their value by tilting toward stocks with particular characteristics that predict future returns. We assess the contribution of these sources of potential value.We also assess the extent to which sell-side analysts make full use of available information signals in formulating stock recommendations. We find that analysts do not fully take into account the ability of various stock characteristics to predict returns. Moreover, our evidence shows that the direction of the bias in analyst recommendations is in line with economic incentives faced by sell-side brokerage firms.We expect this research to be of interest to both financial academics and practitioners. From an academic perspective, the study contributes to a better understanding of how analysts evaluate stocks, and ...

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