Theoretical models in perception assume that confidence is related to the quality or strength of sensory processing. Counter to this intuitive view, here we show that the motor system also contributes to judgments of perceptual confidence. In two experiments we used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to manipulate response-specific representations in the premotor cortex, selectively disrupting post-decision confidence in visual discrimination judgments. Specifically, stimulation of the motor representation associated with the unchosen response reduced confidence in correct responses, thereby reducing metacognitive capacity without changing visual discrimination performance. Effects of TMS on confidence were observed when stimulation was applied both before and after the discrimination occurred, suggesting confidence depends on late-stage metacognitive processes. These results post constraints on models of perceptual confidence and metacognition by revealing that action-specific information in the premotor cortex contributes to perceptual confidence.

Blindsight patients with damage to the visual cortex can discriminate objects but report no conscious visual experience. This provides an intriguing opportunity to allow the study of subjective awareness in isolation from objective performance capacity. However, blindsight is rare, so one promising way to induce the effect in neurologically intact observers is to apply transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the visual cortex. Here, we used a recently-developed criterion-free method to conclusively rule out an important alternative interpretation of TMS-induced performance without awareness: that TMS-induced blindsight may be just due to conservative reporting biases for conscious perception. Critically, using this criterion-free paradigm we have previously shown that introspective judgments were optimal even under visual masking. However, here under TMS, observers were suboptimal, as if they were metacognitively blind to the visual disturbances caused by TMS. We argue that metacognitive judgments depend on observers’ internal statistical models of their own perceptual systems, and introspective suboptimality arises when external perturbations abruptly make those models invalid -- a phenomenon that may also be happening in actual blindsight.