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Estructura del consejo de administración en la empresa familiar versus no familiar: evidencia empírica en España *The structure of the board of directors in family versus non-family fi rms: Empirical evidence in Spain RESUMEN El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la infl uencia de la dimensión cualitativa de la estructura de propiedad, en particular de la identidad familiar del accionista de control mayoritario, sobre la confi guración óptima del Consejo de Administración, así como el efecto que dicha confi guración tiene en la creación de valor de la organización. La técnica econométrica utilizada, el estimador de sistema del Método Generalizado de los Momentos, aplicada para un panel de empresas españolas familiares y no familiares cotizadas en el período 2001-2007, nos permite solventar el tradicional problema de endogeneidad presente en los estudios de gobierno corporativo. Los resultados obtenidos muestran las diferentes necesidades de supervisión y asesoramiento que tienen las empresas familiares con respecto a las de naturaleza no familiar y el consecuente efecto sobre las características estructurales y funcionales de sus consejos de administración. Entre las principales conclusiones encontramos que, a pesar de la creencia generalizada, los consejos pequeños e independientes no son siempre más efi cientes.ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to analyze whether the qualitative dimension of the ownership structure, in particular the family identity of the controlling shareholder, infl uences the optimal confi guration of the Board of Directors, as well as the effect that such confi guration has on fi rm value creation. The econometric technique used, the system estimator of the Generalized Method of Moments, applied to a panel of Spanish family and non-family listed companies in the period 2001-2007, allows us to solve the traditional problem of endogeneity existing in studies of corporate governance. The results show how the need for advising and monitoring depends on the family nature of the controlling shareholder and, therefore, the optimal structure of the Board of Directors differs between the two classes of companies under consideration. Among the main conclusions, we found that, contrary to the widespread believe, smaller and more independent boards are not always more effi cient. Estructura del consejo de administración en la empresa familiar versus no familiar REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE FINANCIACIÓN Y CONTABILIDAD. Vol. XL, n.º 149 · enero-marzo 2011 ARTÍCULOS DOCTRINALES Estructura del consejo de administración en la empresa familiar versus no familiar REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE FINANCIACIÓN Y CONTABILIDAD. Vol. XL, n.º 149 · enero-marzo 2011

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This study analyses whether or not the effect of board independence on a firm's strategic performance is moderated by family involvement in ownership and control. Moderation of the board's size and the independent director ratio are tested under quadratic specifications. The effect of CEO duality with family involvement on long-term sales growth is also measured. The empirical analysis is conducted in the Southern European context using a sample of publicly traded firms that have concentrated ownership structures. The main findings indicate that when nonlinearities are considered, family involvement moderates the relationship between the independent director ratio and firm performance. The optimal proportion of independent directors is lower in family businesses than in non-family ones. However, the results fail to support nonlinearities for board size. We find positive linear relationships between both board size and CEO duality with firm performance, which are not moderated by family involvement.

Purpose This paper aims to develop a cross-country analysis of the similarities and differences in the debt maturity structure of listed SMEs from the point of view of corporate governance (CG) attributes in two different economic environments: an OECD (Spain) country and a non-OECD (Argentina) country. Design/methodology/approach Using data from listed SMEs in the Argentinian SME segment (pooled data from 2012 to 2015) and 31 listed SMEs in the Spanish Mercado Alternativo Bursátil for growing firms (MAB_GE)(2014), bivariate and multivariate analyses are performed. Findings Spanish firms with a higher ownership concentration and a large controlling shareholder have higher short-term liabilities (STL) ratios. Participation of women on the board has a negative relation with the STL ratio only for Spain. The participation of corporations in ownership and a Big4 auditor have a negative relation with the STL ratio for both countries. Practical implications These results will help SME managers understand the effects of the application of good governance policies. The study also gives regulators a guideline to develop standards to assist in efficient borrowing in terms of seeking funding in alternative capital markets. Originality/value First, the results provide evidence about the financial impact on the STL ratio of CG attributes in listed SME. Second, as far as the authors know, this is the first paper to analyse the CG attributes of listed SMEs in an OECD country and a non-OECD country. Third, the paper presents CG data derived from an ad hoc basis elaborated from different websites and databases.