This paper borrows an analytical method from the sciences to solve an important problem in Roman history which has long seemed intractable: estimating the proportion of provincials who had Roman citizenship before Caracalla's general grant of 212/213 CE. The scale of enfranchisement in the early empire has important ramifications for our understanding of the significance of Roman citizenship in that period and the impact of Caracalla's grant. Yet it has so far eluded quantification entirely. Previous efforts have focussed on counting names on inscriptions and other documents and failed to produce any robust conclusions. The problem demands a new approach. This paper starts from the fact that we know that there was a limited number of mechanisms by which new citizens were created and shows that there are limits to the number of citizens those mechanisms can have created over two centuries. There is of course considerable uncertainty about many of the relevant variables, but this can be managed thanks to well-established probabilistic techniques for the estimation and propagation of uncertainty. Given what we already know about the mechanisms of enfranchisement and the demography of the provinces, I will show, it is extremely unlikely that more than one third of the free population of the provinces were Roman citizens on the eve of Caracalla's grant.
This paper draws on recent advances in our knowledge (much of it owed to the proliferation of military diplomas) and a new analytical method to quantify the number of soldiers and their children who received Roman citizenship between 14 and 212 c.e. Although significant uncertainties remain, these can be quantified and turn out to be small relative to the overall scale of enfranchisement. The paper begins by reviewing what is known about grants of citizenship to soldiers, with particular attention to the remaining uncertainties, before presenting a quantitative model of the phenomenon. The total number of beneficiaries was somewhere in the region 0.9–1.6 million — significantly lower than previous estimates have suggested. It also emerges that the rate of enfranchisement varied substantially over time, in line with significant changes in manpower, length of service (and hence the number of recruits and discharged veterans) and the rate of family formation among soldiers. The Supplementary Material available online (https://doi.org/10.1017/S0075435819000662) contains a database of military diplomas (Supplementary Appendix 1), a mathematical model of enfranchisement implemented in MS Excel (Supplementary Appendix 2), a description of the model (Supplementary Appendix 3A) and a derivation of the model of attrition across service cohorts in Fig. 6 (Supplementary Appendix 3B).
The subjective interpretation of probability—increasingly influential in other fields—makes probability a useful tool of historical analysis. It provides a framework that can accommodate the significant epistemic uncertainty involved in estimating historical quantities, especially (but not only) regarding periods for which we have limited data. Conceptualizing uncertainty in terms of probability distributions is a useful discipline because it forces historians to consider the degree of uncertainty as well as to identify a most-likely value. It becomes even more useful when multiple uncertain quantities are combined in a single analysis, a common occurrence in ancient history. Though it may appear a radical departure from current practice, it builds upon a probabilism that is already latent in historical reasoning. Most estimates of quantities in ancient history are implicit expressions of probability distributions, insofar as they represent the value judged to be most likely, given the available evidence. But the traditional point-estimate approach leaves historians’ beliefs about the likelihood of other possible values unclear or unexamined.
The fleets are often neglected in consideration of the military forces of the Roman empire – indeed, some estimates of military strength have ignored them completely.1 Even more egregious is their omission in discussions of the rôle of the army in disseminating Roman citizenship, since the soldiers serving in the fleets benefitted from the same system of regular grants as did auxiliaries. When the fleets are included in inventories of the military, most scholars reckon them at either 30,000 or 40,000 men. In so doing, they are relying explicitly or implicitly on the work of C. G. Starr or M. Reddé, respectively. There has been no discussion of the discrepancy between them. Moreover, those who rely on Reddé tend to overlook the fact that he himself implied a strength of more than 50,000 men. This paper aims to draw attention to the significance of the large divergence between the two estimates and to offer a new one that takes better account of the uncertainties involved. It reviews the evidence adduced by Starr and Reddé but also draws on newer data from the archaeology of fleet bases and military diplomas. I conclude that the combined strength of the fleets was probably c.25,000 men, somewhat smaller than Starr suggested. Yet it is just as important to recognise that the margin of error remains large.
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