Abstract

Publishing data about individuals without revealing sensitive information about them is an important problem. In recent years, a new definition of privacy called k -anonymity has gained popularity. In a k -anonymized dataset, each record is indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other records with respect to certain identifying attributes. In this article, we show using two simple attacks that a k -anonymized dataset has some subtle but severe privacy problems. First, an attacker can discover the values of sensitive attributes when there is little diversity in those sensitive attributes. This is a known problem. Second, attackers often have background knowledge, and we show that k -anonymity does not guarantee privacy against attackers using background knowledge. We give a detailed analysis of these two attacks, and we propose a novel and powerful privacy criterion called ℓ-diversity that can defend against such attacks. In addition to building a formal foundation for ℓ-diversity, we show in an experimental evaluation that ℓ-diversity is practical and can be implemented efficiently.

We show the existence of concurrent non-malleable commitments based on the existence of one-way functions. Our proof of security only requires the use of black-box techniques, and additionally provides an arguably simplified proof of the existence of even stand-alone secure non-malleable commitments.

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