Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of the characteristics of audit committee chairman (ACC) (tenure, age, gender, ethnicity, accounting expertise and directorship) on earnings management (EM) practices. Design/methodology/approach The Jones model and modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995) were used to determine the discretionary accruals (DA) of 288 Malaysian listed firms with lowest positive earnings for the years 2013‒2015. Findings The results of the ordinary least squares regression indicate that only tenure, gender and ethnicity of the ACC are associated with DA. A further test was conducted by dividing firms into two groups: firms whose boards are chaired by a family member and firms whose boards are chaired by a non-family member. The results reveal that it is possible for firms whose boards are chaired by family members to cause the corporate governance (CG) mechanisms, particularly the audit committee, to lose their effectiveness in overcoming the EM problem. In addition, robustness tests were conducted by using panel data regression, where the results were found to be similar to the original regression results. Originality/value This study alerts policymakers, firms and their stakeholders, as well as researchers, regarding the importance of having an independent board chairman, who has no relationship with any directors or major shareholders, as this may hinder the effectiveness of CG mechanisms in curbing EM, especially in emerging countries, such as Malaysia, where it is very difficult to stop members of the family from becoming board directors.

A board chairman is a very influential figure in a firm which may be dominated by an insider director, who, in some cases, is a family member. Consequently, the board chairmen (BC) may play a vital role in the firm's output, especially when they sit on the board committees. Therefore, the current study aims to examine the influence of the BC who are also: the chairmen of the nomination committee (BCNDUAL); ordinary members of the nomination committee (BCNMEM); the chairmen of the remuneration committee (BCRDUAL); and ordinary members of the remuneration committee (BCRMEM), on the level of accrual earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM). This study also tests the overall influence of the BC's involvement in the nomination committee (BCNINV) by combining the terms of BCNDUAL and BCNMEM into BCNINV and the overall influence of BC's involvement in the remuneration committee (BCRINV) by combining the terms of BCRDUAL and BCRMEM into BCRINV, on the level of AEM and REM. This study selected 300 firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia Main Market with the lowest positive performance (based on return on assets (ROA)) for the years 2013 to 2015. The random-effects feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression shows that BCNDUAL, BCNMEM and BCNINV have a significant positive relationship with AEM and REM. However, BCRDUAL and BCRINV have a significant negative relationship with AEM but not with REM. This study aims to alert policy makers, firms and their stakeholders, as well as researchers of the need to strengthen their board committees' effectiveness (especially the nomination committee), and to make them more independent.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the mechanisms of corporate governance (CG) in firms that have a policy of whistle-blowing (WBP) are more effective in mitigating real earnings management (REM) than those without WBP. To achieve this objective, the sample of the study, 288 Malaysian firms for the years 2013 to 2015, have been grouped into firms with and without WBP. In addition, the Roychowdhury Models were used to determine the abnormal levels of the REM. The results show that most of the CG mechanisms, i.e., audit committee (AC) size, AC meetings, AC independence and auditor size in firms with WBP are found to be significantly associated with low level of REM which supporting agency and resource dependence theories. However, only board independence and ownership concentration are found to be significantly associated with high level of REM. Regarding firms without WBP, most of the CG mechanisms, i.e., AC size, women in the AC, AC accenting expertise and ownership concentration, are found to be significantly associated with high level of REM. However, only board meetings, AC multiple directorships and auditor size are found to be significantly associated with low level of REM. The finding of this study suggests that having WBP in a firm could improve the monitoring role of the CG mechanisms towards mitigating REM. However, strengthening the role of WBP is still necessary to improve the efficiency of the monitoring role of CG mechanisms. Hence, there is a need for more policy and law that could encourage whistle-blowers to disclose any misconducts in firms and at the same time, prevent management from undermining the effectiveness of the whistle-blowing policy. The findings of this study will enrich the body of literature where there is no previous study has been done in respect of REM.

This paper investigates the effect of the involvement of the board chairman in the audit committee (AC) on earnings management (EM). It examines Bursa Malaysia-listed companies with the lowest positive earnings for the years 2013 to 2015. The Modified Jones Model by Kasznik (1999) was used to determine discretionary accruals. An AC that includes its board chairman as an ordinary member is associated with greater discretionary accruals. However, a board chairman who is also the chairman of the AC does not seem to influence discretionary accruals. This paper supports the agency theory and policy-makers' efforts to prevent board chairmen from sitting on ACs. It is the first study that uses the agency theory to describe the association between the board chairman's involvement in the both AC and EM. This study alerts policy-makers, stakeholders and researchers to the influence of a board chairman serving on the AC in curbing EM. Furthermore, it provides empirical evidence that the majority of Malaysian companies whose board chairmen are involved in the AC appoint the chairman as an ordinary member of the AC. This indicates that executive directors may affect such actions. Hence, more policies are needed to improve AC independence.

This study attempts to investigate the influence of accounting expertise in the AC on the level of accrual earnings management (AEM) in Malaysian firms by using two proxies, the Modified Jones Models by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kasznik (1999). A sample of 143 firms with slight positive earnings were selected from the Bursa Malaysia Main Market for 2013, 2014 and 2015. Using panel data regression, this study shows that accounting expertise in the AC does not mitigate AEM. The accounting expertise of the AC directors and chairman and the AC's balanced accounting expertise have a positive relationship with attitude for AEM. In line with prior studies, this paper concludes that AC directors are either not truly independent or do not have time or energy to mitigate earnings management practices. Thus, more policies are needed to strengthen the independence of the AC and ensure the members carry out their duties more responsibly.JEL Classifications: G34, G38, M42, M48, M41