It is widely argued that farmers are unwilling to pay adequate fees for surface water irrigation to recover the costs associated with maintenance and improvement of delivery systems. In this paper, we use a discrete choice experiment to study farmer preferences for irrigation characteristics along two branch canals in Punjab Province in eastern Pakistan. We find that farmers are generally willing to pay well in excess of current surface water irrigation costs for increased surface water reliability and that the amount that farmers are willing to pay is an increasing function of their existing surface water supply as well as location along the main canal branch. This explicit translation of implicit willingness-to-pay (WTP) for water (via expenditure on groundwater pumping) to WTP for reliable surface water demonstrates the potential for greatly enhanced cost recovery in the Indus Basin Irrigation System via appropriate setting of water user fees, driven by the higher WTP of those currently receiving reliable supplies.
ABSTRACT. Conventional wisdom in many agricultural systems across the world is that farmers cannot, will not, or should not pay the full costs associated with surface water delivery. Across Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, only a handful can claim complete recovery of operation, maintenance, and capital costs; across Central and South Asia, fees are lower still, with farmers in Nepal, India, and Kazakhstan paying fractions of a U.S. penny for a cubic meter of water. In Pakistan, fees amount to roughly USD 1-2 per acre per season. However, farmers in Pakistan spend orders of magnitude more for diesel fuel to pump groundwater each season, suggesting a latent willingness to spend for water that, under the right conditions, could potentially be directed toward water-use fees for surface water supply. Although overall performance could be expected to improve with greater cost recovery, asymmetric access to water in canal irrigation systems leaves the question open as to whether those benefits would be equitably shared among all farmers in the system. We develop an agent-based model (ABM) of a small irrigation command to examine efficiency and equity outcomes across a range of different cost structures for the maintenance of the system, levels of market development, and assessed water charges. We find that, robust to a range of different cost and structural conditions, increased water charges lead to gains in both efficiency and concomitant improvements in equity as investments in canal infrastructure and system maintenance improve the conveyance of water resources further down watercourses. This suggests that, under conditions in which (1) farmers are currently spending money to pump groundwater to compensate for a failing surface water system, and (2) there is the possibility that through initial investment to provide perceptibly better water supply, genuine win-win solutions can be attained through higher water-use fees to beneficiary farmers.
The Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS) lacks a system for measuring canal inflows, storages, and outflows that is trusted by all parties, transparent, and accessible. An earlier attempt for telemetering flows in the IBIS did not deliver. There is now renewed interest in revisiting telemetry in Pakistan’s IBIS at both national and provincial scales. These investments are typically approached with an emphasis on hardware procurement contracts. This paper describes the experience from field installations of flow measurement instruments and communication technology to make the case that canal flows can be measured at high frequency and displayed remotely to the stakeholders with minimal loss of data and lag time between measurement and display. The authors advocate rolling out the telemetry system across IBIS as a data as a service (DaaS) contract rather than as a hardware procurement contract. This research addresses a key issue of how such a DaaS contract can assure data quality, which is often a concern with such contracts. The research findings inform future telemetry investment decisions in large-scale irrigation systems, particularly the IBIS.
ABSTRACT. The Indus Basin Irrigation System suffers significant inequity in access to surface water across its millions of users. Information, i.e., monitoring and reporting of water availability, may be of value in improving conditions across the basin, and we investigated this via an experimental game of water distribution in Punjab, Pakistan. We found evidence that flow information allowed players to take more effective action to target overuse, and that overall activities that might bring social disapproval were reduced with information. However, we did not find any overall improvement in equity across the system, suggesting that information on its own might not be sufficient to lead to better water distribution among irrigators.
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