A substantial scholarship has studied the extent to which states across the political and geographic spectrums rely on legal, bureaucratic, and judicial institutions to govern religion. However, a deeper inquiry into the mechanisms through which regulation occurs has yet been achieved. This article foregrounds conversion, understood as mobility between social groups in which belief and sincerity may figure but is not reducible to either, to observe these dynamics. Through an analysis of Egyptian jurisprudence on the right to change religion as well as interviews with complainants and litigators, the article challenges widespread assumptions about who and what constitute the regulatory field. It also shows how religious difference is produced in the legal‐bureaucratic encounter. By accounting for institutions that are not typically considered part of the regulatory field nor thought to be bound by the strictures of legal positivism, this article further occasions a rethinking of the public–private distinction within critiques of secularism.

In the last few decades, the study of law and religion has undergone considerable reconstruction. Less and less constrained by modern statist construals of rights talk or tied to confessional contexts, the comparative study of the intersection of law and religion by anthropologists, historians, sociologists, and religious studies scholars is undergoing a real renaissance. Exciting new work explores the entanglement of legal and religious ideas, institutions, and material objects across the entire space and time of human history. This article models an engagement between the academic study of religion and sociolegal scholarship by introducing scholars in both fields to contemporary debates in the study of law and religion. These debates examine how and when state law persists as a meaningful arena of contestation; the role of indigenous elites and arrangements of legal pluralism in colonial contexts; and new approaches to economy, race, and sovereignty and citizenship. By mobilizing an understanding of law that does not take for granted the state's alleged monopoly on generating and regulating legal normativity, the article argues that holding law and religion in abeyance as normative traditions invites a far more expansive imaging of these universals in their singularity, in their copresence, and as overlapping domains.