Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AGDI Working Paper Research DepartmentOn the channels of foreign aid to corruption Foreign aid channeled through government's consumption expenditure increases corruption.(2) Development assistance channeled via private investment and tax effort decreases corruption. It follows that foreign aid that is targeted towards reducing corruption should be channeled via private investment and tax effort, not through government expenditure. Our results integrate an indirect component and reconcile the debate by showing that, the effect could either be positive or negative depending on the transmission channel.JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O10; O55

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In this article, we investigate the relevance of the glass ceiling hypothesis in France, according to which there exist larger gender wage gaps at the upper tail of the wage distribution. Using a matched worker-firm data set of about 1 30 000 employees and 14 000 employers, we estimate quantile regressions and rely on a principal component analysis to summarize information specific to the firms. Our different results show that accounting for firm-related characteristics reduces the gender earnings gap at the top of the distribution, but the latter still remains much higher at the top than at the bottom. Furthermore, a quantile decomposition shows that the gender wage gap is mainly due to differences in the returns to observed characteristics rather than in differences in characteristics between men and women.

Fine, Probability of detection and punishment, Corruption, Information, K4,

The paper provides theoretical and empirical justifications for the instrumentality of foreign aid in stimulating private investment and fixed capital formation through fiscal policy mechanisms. We propose an endogenous growth theory based on an extension of Barro (1990) by postulating that the positive effect of aid mitigates the burden of the taxation system on the private sector of recipient countries. The empirical validity is based on data from 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. While the findings on the tax effort channel are overwhelmingly consistent with theory across specifications and fundamental characteristics, those of the 'government expenditure' channel are a little heterogeneous but broadly in line with the theoretical postulations. Justification for the slight heterogeneity and policy implications are discussed.JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O10; O55

According to the demonstration effect theory, parents make intergenerational transfers to their elders in order to elicit a symmetric future behavior from their children. In this paper we show that upstream transfers are expected to increase with low returns from alternative financial assets and with the donor's life expectancy. The latter effect creates a greater incentive for daughters to care for parents.

In this paper, we examine the old-age security hypothesis according to which parents rear children because they expect the latter to care for them in their later years. In developing countries where there are no perfect capital markets, children are usually viewed as a potential source of income and as a time-related support in old age. However, investing in children remains risky. By focusing on uncertainty about the parental consumption during old age, we show that there exists a precautionary motive for the demand for children so that fertility of prudent parents is expected to increase.

We propose a dynamic efficiency wage model with learning by doing. By taking into account the change in the stock of workers' knowledge, firms set efficiency wages such that the effort-wage elasticity is not in general equal to one.