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This article presents an approach to graduate (and professional) training that views becoming an ethical psychologist as an acculturation process. J.W. Berry's (1980, 2003) model of acculturation strategies is used as a framework for understanding ethical acculturation, a developmental process during which students can use several types of adaptation strategies. Students enter training with their own moral value traditions and concepts but are confronted with new ethical principles and rules, some of which may be inconsistent with their ethics of origin. The article explores several applications of the framework to ethics courses, practicum supervision, and other areas of training.

The present study investigated the hypothesis that psychological symptoms may serve a self-protective function by providing an alternative explanation for potential failure in evaluating situations. It was hypothesized that highly test-anxious subjects would report anxiety symptoms in a pattern that reflected strategic presentation of symptoms; more specifically, it was predicted that greater reported anxiety should result when anxiety was a viable explanation for poor performance on an intelligence test and that lower reported anxiety should result when anxiety was not a viable explanation for poor performance. Analysis of state measures of self-reported anxiety supported these predictions. Further analysis indicated that when anxiety was not a viable explanation for poor test performance, high test-anxiety subjects reported reduced effort as an alternative self-protective strategy. These results are discussed in terms of traditional models of symptoms as self-protective strategies, current social psychological models of symptoms, and in reference to recent theory and research about the nature and treatment of test anxiety.

Most current ethical decision-making models provide a logical and reasoned process for making ethical judgments, but these models are empirically unproven and rely upon assumptions of rational, conscious, and quasilegal reasoning. Such models predominate despite the fact that many nonrational factors influence ethical thought and behavior, including context, perceptions, relationships, emotions, and heuristics. For example, a large body of behavioral research has demonstrated the importance of automatic intuitive and affective processes in decision making and judgment. These processes profoundly affect human behavior and lead to systematic biases and departures from normative theories of rationality. Their influence represents an important but largely unrecognized component of ethical decision making. We selectively review this work; provide various illustrations; and make recommendations for scientists, trainers, and practitioners to aid them in integrating the understanding of nonrational processes with ethical decision making.

Questionnaires were sent to 196 psychologists in private practice. Of the 104 (53%) respondents, 28.8% reported using written consent forms. The major reason cited for not using them was a preference for oral agreements. The content of the forms dealt primarily with issues regarding fees and not with information that satisfies the requirements of informed consent, sueh as risks of treatment and alternative treatments. The average readability for the consent forms returned was in the "difficult" range, equivalent to an academically oriented magazine. Therapists need to evaluate their practices regarding informed consent, in order to increase clients' autonomy and their understanding of information provided.In the last 30 years, medical practitioners and researchers-as well as the legislators who regulate them-have paid increasing attention to the ethical and legal doctrine of informed consent (Annas, 1983; Lidz ct al., 1984). Psychologists have also recognized the rights of clients and MITCHELL M. HANDELSMAN received his PhD in clinical psychology from the University of Kansas in 1981. He is currently assistant professor of psychology at the University of Colorado at Denver. His interests include ethical issues, teaching of psychology, family therapy, and self-handicapping strategies. MELINDA B. KEMPER, MA, is a developmental specialist in the child development unit of The Children's Hospital in Denver. She is also a doctoral candidate in the School of Professional Psychology at the University of Denver. She has conducted research on the fragile X syndrome. PAMELA KESSON-CRAIG received her MA in psychology in 1984 from the University of Colorado at Denver, where she is now director of the Center for Women's Resources. Her applied interests include neuropsychological assessment and counseling of people with multiple disabilities. JOANNE MCLAIN received her MA in psychology from the University of Colorado at Denver in 1985 and is now a clinician at Southwest Denver Community Mental Health Center. She has conducted research on the acceptance of personality test feedback. CYNTHIA JOHNSRUD graduated from the University of Colorado at Denver in 1984 and is now in the PsyD program at the University of Denver. She has a background in nursing and is interested in health psychology.