Neural activity has been suggested to initially trigger ATP production by glycolysis, rather than oxidative phosphorylation, for three reasons: glycolytic enzymes are associated with ion pumps; neurons may increase their energy supply by activating glycolysis in astrocytes to generate lactate; and activity increases glucose uptake more than O 2 uptake. In rat hippocampal slices, neuronal activity rapidly decreased the levels of extracellular O 2 and intracellular NADH (reduced nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide), even with lactate dehydrogenase blocked to prevent lactate generation, or with only 20% superfused O 2 to mimic physiological O 2 levels. Pharmacological analysis revealed an energy budget in which 11% of O 2 use was on presynaptic action potentials, 17% was on presynaptic Ca 2ϩ entry and transmitter release, 46% was on postsynaptic glutamate receptors, and 26% was on postsynaptic action potentials, in approximate accord with theoretical brain energy budgets. Thus, the major mechanisms mediating brain information processing are all initially powered by oxidative phosphorylation, and an astrocyte-neuron lactate shuttle is not needed for this to occur.

SummaryAdaptive success in social animals depends on an ability to infer the likely actions of others. Little is known about the neural computations that underlie this capacity. Here, we show that the brain models the values and choices of others even when these values are currently irrelevant. These modeled choices use the same computations that underlie our own choices, but are resolved in a distinct neighboring medial prefrontal brain region. Crucially, however, when subjects choose on behalf of a partner instead of themselves, these regions exchange their functional roles. Hence, regions that represented values of the subject’s executed choices now represent the values of choices executed on behalf of the partner, and those that previously modeled the partner now model the subject. These data tie together neural computations underlying self-referential and social inference, and in so doing establish a new functional axis characterizing the medial wall of prefrontal cortex.

Integrating costs and benefits is crucial for optimal decision-making. Although much is known about decisions that involve outcomerelated costs (e.g., delay, risk), many of our choices are attached to actions and require an evaluation of the associated motor costs. Yet how the brain incorporates motor costs into choices remains largely unclear. We used human fMRI during choices involving monetary reward and physical effort to identify brain regions that serve as a choice comparator for effort-reward trade-offs. By independently varying both options' effort and reward levels, we were able to identify the neural signature of a comparator mechanism. A network involving supplementary motor area and the caudal portion of dorsal anterior cingulate cortex encoded the difference in reward (positively) and effort levels (negatively) between chosen and unchosen choice options. We next modeled effort-discounted subjective values using a novel behavioral model. This revealed that the same network of regions involving dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and supplementary motor area encoded the difference between the chosen and unchosen options' subjective values, and that activity was best described using a concave model of effort-discounting. In addition, this signal reflected how precisely value determined participants' choices. By contrast, separate signals in supplementary motor area and ventromedial prefrontal cortex correlated with participants' tendency to avoid effort and seek reward, respectively. This suggests that the critical neural signature of decision-making for choices involving motor costs is found in human cingulate cortex and not ventromedial prefrontal cortex as typically reported for outcome-based choice. Furthermore, distinct frontal circuits seem to drive behavior toward reward maximization and effort minimization.

very day, chacma baboons, an old world primate, navigate to and from the safety of their sleeping post and distant foraging or watering sites 1. The decision to move to alternative locations is not simply guided by accumulation of sensory evidence for that choice but by internal representation or memory of the alternative choice's value. The same is true when they move back toward the sleeping post in the evening. While sensory and associative decision-making have been well-studied 2 , less is known about how representations of counterfactual choices-choices not currently taken but which may be taken in the

There has been considerable interest from the fields of biology, economics, psychology, and ecology about how decision costs decrease the value of rewarding outcomes. For example, formal descriptions of how reward value changes with increasing temporal delays allow for quantifying individual decision preferences, as in animal species populating different habitats, or normal and clinical human populations. Strikingly, it remains largely unclear how humans evaluate rewards when these are tied to energetic costs, despite the surge of interest in the neural basis of effort-guided decision-making and the prevalence of disorders showing a diminished willingness to exert effort (e.g., depression). One common assumption is that effort discounts reward in a similar way to delay. Here we challenge this assumption by formally comparing competing hypotheses about effort and delay discounting. We used a design specifically optimized to compare discounting behavior for both effort and delay over a wide range of decision costs (Experiment 1). We then additionally characterized the profile of effort discounting free of model assumptions (Experiment 2). Contrary to previous reports, in both experiments effort costs devalued reward in a manner opposite to delay, with small devaluations for lower efforts, and progressively larger devaluations for higher effort-levels (concave shape). Bayesian model comparison confirmed that delay-choices were best predicted by a hyperbolic model, with the largest reward devaluations occurring at shorter delays. In contrast, an altogether different relationship was observed for effort-choices, which were best described by a model of inverse sigmoidal shape that is initially concave. Our results provide a novel characterization of human effort discounting behavior and its first dissociation from delay discounting. This enables accurate modelling of cost-benefit decisions, a prerequisite for the investigation of the neural underpinnings of effort-guided choice and for understanding the deficits in clinical disorders characterized by behavioral inactivity.

To understand brain circuits it is necessary both to record and manipulate their activity. Transcranial ultrasound stimulation (TUS) is a promising non-invasive brain stimulation technique. To date, investigations report short-lived neuromodulatory effects, but to deliver on its full potential for research and therapy, ultrasound protocols are required that induce longer-lasting ‘offline’ changes. Here, we present a TUS protocol that modulates brain activation in macaques for more than one hour after 40 s of stimulation, while circumventing auditory confounds. Normally activity in brain areas reflects activity in interconnected regions but TUS caused stimulated areas to interact more selectively with the rest of the brain. In a within-subject design, we observe regionally specific TUS effects for two medial frontal brain regions – supplementary motor area and frontal polar cortex. Independently of these site-specific effects, TUS also induced signal changes in the meningeal compartment. TUS effects were temporary and not associated with microstructural changes.

A dominant focus in studies of learning and decision-making is the neural coding of scalar reward value. This emphasis ignores the fact that choices are strongly shaped by a rich representation of potential rewards. Here, using fMRI adaptation, we demonstrate that responses in the human orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) encode a representation of the specific type of food reward predicted by a visual cue. By controlling for value across rewards and by linking each reward with two distinct stimuli, we could test for representations of reward-identity that were independent of associative information. Our results show reward-identity representations in a medial-caudal region of OFC, independent of the associated predictive stimulus. This contrasts with a more rostro-lateral OFC region encoding rewardidentity representations tied to the predicate stimulus. This demonstration of adaptation in OFC to reward specific representations opens an avenue for investigation of more complex decision mechanisms that are not immediately accessible in standard analyses, which focus on correlates of average activity.

People and other animals learn the values of choices by observing the contingencies between them and their outcomes. However, decisions are not guided by choice-linked reward associations alone; macaques also maintain a memory of the general, average reward ratethe global reward statein an environment. Remarkably, global reward state affects the way that each choice outcome is valued and influences future decisions so that the impact of both choice success and failure is different in rich and poor environments. Successful choices are more likely to be repeated but this is especially the case in rich environments. Unsuccessful choices are more likely to be abandoned but this is especially likely in poor environments. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) revealed two distinct patterns of activity, one in anterior insula and one in the dorsal raphe nucleus, that track global reward state as well as specific outcome events.