According to prescriptive decision theories, the generation of options for choice is a central aspect of decision making. A too narrow representation of the problem may indeed limit the opportunity to evaluate promising options. However, despite the theoretical and applied significance of this topic, the cognitive processes underlying option generation are still unclear. In particular, while a cued recall account of option generation emphasizes the role of memory and executive control, other theoretical proposals stress the importance of ideation processes based on various search and thinking processes. Unfortunately, relevant behavioral evidence on the cognitive processes underlying option generation is scattered and inconclusive. In order to reach a better understanding, we carried out an individual-differences study employing a wide array of cognitive predictors, including measures of episodic memory, semantic memory, cognitive control, and ideation fluency. The criterion tasks consisted of three different poorly-structured decision-making scenarios, and the participants were asked to generate options to solve these problems. The main criterion variable of the study was the number of valid options generated, but also the diversity and the quality of generated options were examined. The results showed that option generation fluency and diversity in the context of ill-structured decision making are supported by ideation ability even after taking into account the effects of individual differences in several other aspects of cognitive functioning. Thus, ideation processes, possibly supported by search and thinking processes, seem to contribute to option generation beyond basic associative memory retrieval. The findings of the study also indicate that generating more options may have multifaceted consequences for choice, increasing the quality of the best option generated but decreasing the mean quality of the options in the generated set.

Although the literature on the influence of memory on decisions is well developed, research on the effects of decision making on memory is rather sparse and scattered. Choice-supportive misremembering (i.e., misremembering choice-related information that boosts the chosen option and/or demotes the foregone options) has been observed in several studies and has the potential to affect future choices. Nonetheless, no attempt has been made to review the relevant literature, categorize the different types of choice-supportive misremembering observed, and critically appraise the existing evidence and proposed explanations. Thus, starting from a new theoretically motivated and empirically grounded taxonomy, we review the current research. Our taxonomy classifies choice-supportive misremembering into four conceptually distinct types: misattribution is when information is attributed to the wrong source, fact distortion when the facts are remembered in a distorted manner, false memory when items that were not part of the original decision scenarios are remembered as presented and, finally, selective forgetting is when information is selectively forgotten. After assessing the impact of various potentially moderating factors, we evaluate the evidence for each type of misremembering and conclude that the support for the phenomenon is solid in relation to misattribution when recognition memory is assessed, but significantly weaker for the other three types, and when other memory tests are used to assess memory. Finally, we review the cognitive and emotional explanations proposed for choice-supportive misremembering in the light of the available evidence and identify the main gaps in the current knowledge and the more promising avenues for future research.

Research on prospective memory has paid no attention to the way in which the intentions to be remembered are framed. In two studies on time-based prospective memory, participants had to remember multiple delayed intentions framed as time rules (i.e., respond every 7 min, every 10 min) or as a series of corresponding instances (i.e., respond at Times 7, 10, 14, 20, 21, 28, 30, etc.). We appraised the effects of intention framing on intention learning, intention representation, strategies used to set the upcoming intention, cognitive load (monitoring cost), and prospective memory performance. Study 1 involved three time rules and corresponding instances. The results showed that time rules are learned faster than corresponding instances and that intention frames shaped the way intentions were mentally represented. Furthermore, the rule frame was associated with a more cognitively demanding incremental planning strategy to establish the upcoming intention, whereas the instance frame promoted the serial recall of intentions. Study 2 replicated the results on representations and strategies with four time rules and corresponding sets of instances, and it showed better prospective memory performance following the instance frame than rule frame. Together, these studies show that two alternative ways of framing multiple delayed intentions in the same prospective memory task induce significant differences in the way intentions are represented, in the cognitive strategies used to set the upcoming intention, and in performance. Theoretical and applied implications of the results for the prospective memory field are discussed.