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We consider auctions where bidders care about the reputational effects of their bidding and argue that the amount of information disclosed at the end of the auction will influence bidding. We focus on bid disclosure rules that capture all of the realistic cases. We show that bidders distort their bidding in a way that conforms to stylized facts about takeovers/licence auctions. We rank the disclosure rules in terms of their expected revenues and find that, under certain conditions, full disclosure will not be optimal. First-price and second-price auctions with price disclosure are not revenue equivalent and we rank them. * Manuscript .2 As we shall see, reputational incentives introduce issues that are reminiscent of those found in common value auctions. Thus, information released during an ascending auction with more than two bidders is important for the bidding behavior of remaining bidders. By excluding this case, we focus on the implications for bidding behavior of information released at the end of auctions. Nevertheless, we note that our results regarding over-or underbidding (Proposition 3) would still hold in such setting. 3 Of course, an environment where the post-auction market is imperfectly competitive and/or there is a commonvalue component in the bidders' valuations is worth investigating for a full understanding of reputational bidding, but we view this as a starting point that clarifies the crucial role of various disclosure rules in an otherwise standard setting. 693 C (2014) by the

We study the optimal design of incentive schemes in the presence of adverse selection and altruistic providers. We assume that providers differ in efficiency, are partially altruistic, and have limited liability. Three types of separating equilibrium emerge. (1) For low levels of altruism the quantity of the efficient and inefficient types is distorted upwards and downwards, respectively; the inefficient type makes zero profits.(2) For moderate levels of altruism the first best is attained: no distortions and profits are zero. (3) For high levels of altruism the quantity of the inefficient type is distorted upwards, and the quantity of the efficient type is distorted either upwards or downwards; the efficient type makes zero profits. Our main result is that the first best can be obtained for some values of altruism, but not necessarily for the highest values. The purchaser is better off with providers with moderate rather than high altruism.

Consider an agent who has an expertise in producing a non-marketable good. This good is valued by a single principal, and there is a verifiable measure of the agent's performance.Crucially, the agent is intrinsically motivated, due to 'warm glow altruism'. In addition, the agent's budget, which is controlled by the principal, must not be less than the monetary performance-cost faced by the agent. This gives rise to a limited-liability constraint. It also restricts the agent's ability to under-report costs. In such environment, we determine the link between the agent's budget and performance. Our results come in contrast to the received solution of the principal-agent problem, and to most in the literature on missionmotivated organisations and public services provision. Crucially, the agent is intrinsically motivated due to 'warm glow altruism'. In addition, the agent's budget, which is controlled by the principal, must not be less than the monetary performance-cost faced by the agent. This gives rise to a limited-liability constraint. It also restricts the agent's ability to under-report costs. In such environment, we determine the link between the agent's budget and performance. Our results come in contrast to the received solution of the principal-agent problem and to most in the literature on missionmotivated organisations and public services provision. I would also like to thank the editor and two referees for very helpful comments that have improved the paper signi…cantly.

Motivated by the Covid-19 epidemic, we build a SIR model with private decisions on social distancing and population heterogeneity in terms of infection-induced fatality rates, and calibrate it to UK data to understand the quantitative importance of these assumptions. Compared to our model, the calibrated benchmark version with constant mean contact rate significantly over-predicts the mean contact rate, the death toll, herd immunity and prevalence peak. Instead, the calibrated counterfactual version with endogenous social distancing but no heterogeneity massively under-predicts these statistics. We use our calibrated model to understand how the impact of mitigating policies on the epidemic may depend on the responses these policies induce across the various population segments. We find that policies that shut down some of the essential sectors have a stronger impact on the death toll than on infections and herd immunity compared to policies that shut down non-essential sectors. Furthermore, there might not be an after-wave after policies that shut down some of the essential sectors are lifted. Restrictions on social distancing can generate welfare gains relative to the case of no intervention. Milder but longer restrictions on less essential activities might be better in terms of these welfare gains than stricter but shorter restrictions, whereas the opposite might be the case for restrictions on more essential activities. Finally, shutting down some of the more essential sectors might generate larger welfare gains than shutting down the less essential sectors.