The news is old – neoliberalism is dead for good, but this time, even Financial Times knows it. Obituaries claim that it had died from the coronavirus, as the state, not the markets, have had to save both the people and the economy. The argument of the article is that these academic and media interpretations of ‘emergency Keynesianism’ misidentify neoliberalism with its anti-statist rhetoric. For neoliberalism is, and has always been, about ‘the free market and the strong state’. In fact, rather than waning in the face of the coronavirus crisis, neoliberal states around the world are using the ongoing ‘war against the virus’ to strengthen their right-hand grip on the conditions of the working classes.
The crucial question of the Habermas-Streeck debate on the crisis in Europe was, ‘Should the political forces resisting the de-democratization of capitalism strive for renewal of the European Union through its deeper integration, as per Habremas, or for peaceful dissolution of the European Union and a retreat to a national state, as per Streeck?’ In this article, the arguments of each author are examined against the background of the left-wing Syriza party’s challenge to European austerity in Greece. Three conclusions are drawn. First, Syriza’s nationally charged populism in opposition coincided with Streeck’s considerations. Second, Syriza’s governmental strategy reflected Habermas’s views. Third, Syriza’s sudden rise to power and its subsequent failure to reverse the austerity both substantiate Streeck’s thesis that at the present juncture renationalization of economic policy represents a condition of the possibility for egalitarian politics in Europe.
This paper analyzes the theoretical framework of the discussion on the national identity of the Bačka Bunjevci. Based on the insight into the main currents within contemporary studies of nations and nationalism, and conceptual analysis of scientific papers that problematize the opening of the ˮBunjevci questionˮ after the breakup of socialist Yugoslavia, we conclude: a) that standard arguments of all parties assume that modern nations have identifiable roots deep in the past; b) that the ˮBunjevci questionˮ shows the opposite, that there are no objective or ˮscientificˮ criteria of a national identity, especially alternative narratives about it; and c) that the ˮBunjevci questionˮ, just like any other national question, is essentially political, that is a question about the collective strategy of a community's survival in the given historical circumstances.
In this paper I will try to show that Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger defended conception of language as a universal medium in both phases of their work. Both philosophers believe that we are „prisoners“ of the language that we speak, so that we can not step outside of it and describe the semantic relationships of language and the world from metalinguistic point of view. For both thinkers the basic problem is of methodological nature: for, if we can not speak about the relationships between language and the world, then how can we say that we can not speak about the relationships between language and the world? I will argue: a) that the universalism of early Wittgenstein and late Heidegger is transcendentally motivated, and that they both deal with the problem of inexperessibility of semantics by invoking the language of poetry as a way to express a universalist point of view, and b) that the universalism of late Wittgenstein and early Heidegger is pragmatically motivated, and that the difference between two philosophers is that early Heidegger accepts, while late Wittgenstein rejects semantic paradox of universalism. For early Heidegger inexpressibility of semantics is evidence that there is something that eludes the ordinary language and that that something has to be grasped by use of special method, for late Wittgenstein it is the evidence that there is nothing that can not be expressed in ordinary language and that the problem of inexpressibility of semantics is a pseudo-problem
APSTRAKT: U ovom radu razmatra se Kripkenštajnova kritika mentalističkog objašnjenja normativnosti jezičkog ponašanja, kao i njegova intersubjektivna koncepcija normativnosti. Argumentuje se protiv vladajućeg tumačenja Kripkenštajnovog stanovišta kao socijalne metafizike normativnosti, teorije koja svodi jezička pravila na konsenzus jezičke zajednice. Ukazuje da Kripkenštajnovo odbacivanje mentalističke postavke da je razumevanje neka vrsta mentalnog stanja rezultira u antiredukcionističkom karakteru intersubjektivne koncepcije normativnosti, koja opisuje kako mi govorimo o razlici između ispravnih i neispravnih jezičkih postupaka u svakodnevnom životu, ali ne kazuje šta je ta razlika, ili od čega se ona sastoji. Otuda se zaključuje da, prema Kripkenštajnu, zajednica jeste jedino normativno sudilište u svakodnevnoj upotrebi jezika, ali nije i vrhovni sudija jer, pre nego da u hodu donosi neopozive presude o pojedinačnim jezičkim postupcima, ona zapravo sačinjava okvir koji omogućava da se normativni sporovi između njenih članova uopšte povedu.
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