Theory suggests a negative relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital. However, empirical research has not, in general, confirmed this. In particular, Botosan (1997) finds no evidence of a negative relationship for firms with a high analyst following, and moreover, Botosan and Plumlee (2002a) find that firms' cost of capital increases with timely disclosures. There are several possible explanations for this puzzle. First, the theory-driven hypothesis may be false and require re-specification. Second, there may be correlated omitted variables contaminating the results. Finally, these inconclusive results may have arisen due to problems with the measurement of disclosure. We construct an innovative measure of timely disclosure, that attempts to capture quality rather than quantity of strategic disclosures. In addition, motivated by new theoretical research by Gietzmann and Trombetta (2003) , we control for a possible omitted variable, namely accounting policy choice. With this revised research design, we find the expected negative relationship. Furthermore, as predicted by Gietzmann and Trombetta, this relationship is only significant for firms adopting aggressive accounting policies. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2005.

In this research we consider how disclosure of accounting policy interacts with subsequent choice over voluntary disclosure of a non-financial performance metric. We compare and contrast regimes. In the first, firms are free to choose between a conservative or an aggressive accounting policy before they decide whether to make additional voluntary disclosures. In the other regime, all firms either voluntarily or via mandation use the same accounting policy. We then investigate the cost of raising capital for firms under the two regimes. We show that communication via voluntary disclosure need not be a simple substitute for communication via accounting policy choice.

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Following Arthur Andersen's conviction for obstructing justice, auditors faced a one-time significant change in their regulatory environment because it was clear that (i) major audit partnerships could be closed and (ii) post Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), regulators would take a far more attentive (aggressive) role. In response auditors considered whether the pricing of audits should be revised to take account of the increased risk of regulatory intervention and litigation. Obviously such re-pricing would need to be targeted at those firms for which the risks were greatest. One early warning signal of such events occurring is the issuance by the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) of a Comment Letter (CL). We investigate whether there is any evidence that if a client receives a CL this is used to re-price audit services. Specifically, we investigate whether issuance resulted in upward pressure on audit fees, and whether this effect was simply transient around the issuance period or alternatively persisted some years into the future. This research finds that after a client receives a CL, auditors adjust audit fees upwards in the period in which the CL is received. In addition it is shown that for subsequent periods in which the auditor does not spend time assisting the client respond to a specific CL, an initial rise in audit fee persists. This is consistent with the hypothesis that auditors reassess the reputation and litigation risk of the client on the basis of the SEC issuance of a Comment Letter.

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For the period of 2006 to 2008, we collect Comment Letters issued by the SEC that question the application of US GAAP by US firms or the application of IFRS by European firms registered with the SEC. We investigate whether institutional investors react to the letters by changing their holdings and whether their responses vary for US registrants and European registrants. We do this via a treatment‐effects model in which we test the hypothesis that institutional investors rebalance their portfolio holdings because they view Comment Letters as informative public signals. We find that institutional investors reduce their equity holdings when firms receive SEC Comment Letters, and their negative reactions are most marked for low turnover institutional investors, who we use to represent those informed investors most prepared to incur costs to closely monitor firms. Next, while noting that the number of Letters questioning application of IFRS are smaller in number relative to those questioning application of US GAAP, we investigate whether there are different reactions to Comment Letters questioning different standards. We show that there is a higher probability of the SEC questioning the application of IFRS as compared to US GAAP. After controlling for firm‐specific conditions that impact the issuance of a Comment Letter, we show that this higher probability has economic significance because institutional investors’ react more negatively to Comment Letters that question the application of IFRS as compared to US GAAP. A content analysis confirms the economic importance of the Comment Letters. We find that in almost half of all IFRS cases the Comment Letters request amendments to financial statements.

When an auditor receives significant fee income from one client it has often been suggested that reappointment concerns may dilute auditors incentives to maintain independence from management. A possible response to this issue could be to mandate the rotation of auditors. However this is costly since new auditors must repeatedly invest in learning a new clients accounting system. In this research we build a model to formally analyze this trade‐off. We find that the desirability of rotation depends critically upon characteristics of the audit market structure and to what extent an individual client dominates an auditors’ client portfolio defined in terms of total fees. We show that although rotation is costly, in audit markets with relatively few large clients (thin markets), the resulting improved incentives for independence outweigh the associated costs. Our research is timely because although historically it may not have been economically desirable to adopt mandatory rotation, currently with increased corporate merger activity taking place, for instance in the oil sector, markets may now have become sufficiently thin to warrant the introduction of rotation.

We develop a model in which there is conflict of interest between the management and the shareholders of an organization. Incompleteness of contracts prevents a simple contracting solution to this problem. We suggest that auditors can play a role in aligning the conflicting interests. However, this result is dependent on auditors maintaining independence from management. Again however, incompletenesses in contracting causes difficulties because it may be hard to ensure that auditors maintain this required independence. In this context, the imposition of potential legal liability (punishment) on the auditor, may be an important commitment mechanism for the auditors, making it credible that they will not collude with the management. In order to give our model institutional structure we study how this collusion may take place through the reappointment concerns of the auditor. In the reappointment game, we consider how legal liability levels could be chosen so that it becomes credible to expect that auditors will not implicitly collude with management and provide a low duty of care.