Civil unmanned aircraft systems, commonly known as drones, have many useful applications but can also be used to intentionally cause harm. Additionally, drones themselves can be subject to unlawful interference. In this article, I analyze how European Union's new rules on drones affect such security threats. I argue that the rules on protecting drones from unlawful interference are promising, although the required security features can also be abused by rogue operators. The intentional misuse of drones, however, is not much deterred by the rules that seek to protect persons and property from such misuse. Rules concerning the operator and the pilot assume compliance, the mandatory technical safeguards can be circumvented, and oversight is difficult because drones are mostly operated from outside airports in a distributed manner. One way to fill the security gap is to employ anti-drone technology that detects drones and prevents them from entering sensitive airspace without permission. Although many airports have already adopted such technology, the EU should consider making it mandatory for the busiest airports. Regardless of rules enacted by the Union, though, reliable and safe means of stopping unlawful drone operations should be employed at critical locations. This applies also to areas like prisons and power plants, the protection of which falls within the ambit of national security.

Throughout their existence, several attempts have been made at naming and categorizing aircraft which are flown without a pilot on board. Regulatory documents by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have called them unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft (systems), drones, and other less popular names. This has resulted in a risk of gaps and incoherence being introduced into the system of international aviation law. The growing field of unmanned aviation has proved difficult to encapsulate in a single term which would serve as a regulatory basis. This article seeks to analyse the terminological dogfight between the most established terms used to regulate the aircraft in question. It presents the legal basis, meaning, implications, and relevance of each term and their mutual relationship. The article recommends doing away with the concept of model aircraft, as it has become difficult to distinguish recreational from non-recreational use of the aircraft in question. A critical angle is taken at the concept of pilotless aircraft, employed in the Chicago Convention. The article acknowledges that both unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft are viable regulatory concepts, but preference is given to the former due to its simplicity and wide scope. The concept of a system is seen as necessary due to the distributed nature of the aircraft.

The integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems (drones) into airspace has turned out to be a real challenge. Drones have difficulties in following many of the rules designed for manned aviation, because drones are plentiful and cheap, because they have no pilot on board, and because they are often flown at a very low altitude. This creates major issues relating to safety, traffic management, privacy, and law enforcement. To solve them, European regulatory bodies have come up with a new concept: U-space.    In this article, I focus on that particular concept. First, I explore several rules designed for manned aviation; second, I present several challenges posed thereto by drones; and third, I analyse how these challenges will be solved in U-space.  My analysis emphasizes that U-space is not merely a legal but also a technological concept, and it is as much a public as it is a private effort. I maintain that this interplay is necessary, since it is counterproductive to develop the concept without taking into account emerging technology and without close cooperation with the industry. My analysis also acknowledges that many U-space services are already available today. However, since many of such services are fragmentary and have only been demonstrated in a controlled environment, I argue that it will take much more effort to bring the concept to its full fruition.

The purpose of this article is to discuss whether a state has a right to divert or intercept a foreign civil aircraft flying above its territory, when the aircraft is under a bomb threat. The analysis stems from the recent incident where a Ryanair passenger jet was diverted to Minsk while flying in Belarusian airspace; however, the article approaches the topic from a general perspective, analyzing the key applicable rules of international aviation safety and security law. The article argues that air sovereignty and national rules on aviation (the latter wherever such exist) provide states acting in good faith the right to divert or intercept foreign aircraft for security reasons. Meanwhile, Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention does not recognize such a right. The right is also limited by international rules that oblige every state to assist aircraft in distress, as well as rules that emphasize the authority and responsibility of the pilot-in-command. Since mid-air interventions are so rare, the legality of states’ actions must be analyzed case-by-case. Regardless, the legal regime of international aviation does not allow states to respond to security threats in whatever way they please, especially if the threat is a mere pretext for politically motivated action.