Four studies investigated a goal regulation view of anxious uncertainty threat (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) and ideological defense. Participants (N = 444) were randomly assigned to have achievement or relationship goals implicitly primed. The implicit goal primes were followed by randomly assigned achievement or relationship threats that have reliably caused generalized, reactive approach motivation and ideological defense in past research. The threats caused anxious uncertainty (Study 1), reactive approach motivation (Studies 2 and 3), and reactive ideological conviction (Study 4) only when threat-relevant goals had first been primed, but not when threat-irrelevant goals had first been primed. Reactive ideological conviction (Study 4) was eliminated if participants were given an opportunity to attribute their anxiety to a mundane source. Results support a goal regulation view of anxious uncertainty, threat, and defense with potential for integrating theories of defensive compensation.

In 3 experiments, participants reacted with religious zeal to anxious uncertainty threats that have caused reactive approach motivation (RAM) in past research (see McGregor, Nash, Mann, & Phills, 2010, for implicit, explicit, and neural evidence of RAM). In Study 1, results were specific to religious ideals and did not extend to merely superstitious beliefs. Effects were most pronounced among the most anxious and uncertainty-averse participants in Study 1 and among the most approach-motivated participants in Study 2 (i.e., with high Promotion Focus, Behavioral Activation, Action Orientation, and Self-Esteem Scale scores). In Studies 2 and 3, anxious uncertainty threats amplified even the most jingoistic and extreme aspects of religious zeal. In Study 3, reactive religious zeal occurred only among participants who reported feeling disempowered in their everyday goals in life. Results support a RAM view of empowered religious idealism for anxiety management (cf. Armstrong, 2000; Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsch, & Nash, 2009).

Reactive Approach Motivation (RAM) theory proposes that the personal uncertainty arising from motivational conflict causes anxiety, and that anxiety draws people to extremes because extremes activate approach‐motivated states that automatically downregulate anxiety. Five new studies consolidate existing evidence for the RAM view of uncertainty‐related threats and reactive extremism. In Studies 1–3, religious, idealistic, and RAM reactions after agentic, communal, and mortality threats were most extreme when threat‐relevant goals had been implicitly primed to create motivational conflict. In Study 4 uncertainty predicted extreme reactions only if goal conflict had been experimentally manipulated. In Study 5 personal uncertainty uniquely predicted lifestyle extremes among undergraduates whose educational goals were conflicted by a labor disruption at their university. Results converge on the conclusion that uncertainty‐related threats cause defensively extreme RAM reactions only if they arouse personal uncertainty about active goals. Results suggest that policies and programs to support the prosocial and/or nonextreme goals, ideals, and identifications of at‐risk people would reduce their motivation for antisocial extremism.

The present studies examined whether implicit or explicit autonomy dispositions moderate the relationship between felt autonomy and well-being. Study 1 (N = 187 undergraduate students) presents an initial test of the moderator hypothesis by predicting flow experience from the interaction of autonomy need satisfaction and autonomy dispositions. Study 2 (N = 127 physically inactive persons) used vignettes involving an autonomy (un)supportive coach to test a moderated mediation model in which perceived coach autonomy support leads to well-being through basic need satisfaction. Again, the effects of need satisfaction on well-being were hypothesized to be moderated by an implicit autonomy disposition. Study 1 showed that individuals with a strong implicit autonomy (but not power or achievement) motive disposition derived more flow experience from felt autonomy than individuals with a weak implicit autonomy disposition. Study 2 revealed that perceived autonomy support from sports coaches, which we experimentally induced with a vignette method, leads to autonomy satisfaction, leading in turn to positive effects on well-being. This indirect effect held at high and average but not low implicit autonomy disposition. The results indicate that the degree to which people benefit from autonomy need satisfaction depends on their implicit disposition toward autonomy.

Mindfulness and flow are both beneficial states of mind, but are they difficult to experience simultaneously? After all, flow involves losing self-awareness within an activity, and mindfulness involves maintaining self-awareness throughout or even despite an activity. In three studies, we examine this potential antagonism, finding negative associations between mindfulness and flow as assessed in a variety of ways and contexts. These associations emerged within Global trait data and diary data concerning daily goal behavior (Study 1), experience-sampling data concerning behavior at the time of signaling (Study 2), and experimental data concerning the experience of playing the flow-conducive computer game, Tetris, after undergoing a mindfulness induction (Study 3). However, these associations only apply to the “absorption” aspect of flow, not the “sense of control” aspect.

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In this introductory article we first describe the impetus for this special issue. What made us think that Self-Determination Theory (SDT) might provide a sort of foundation for the rest of personality psychology? For readers unfamiliar with SDT, we then provide a historical overview which covers the evolution of the six "mini-theories" that currently comprise SDT: cognitive evaluation theory, causality orientations theory, organismic integration theory, basic psychological needs theory, goal contents theory, and relational motivation theory. Following each section are preliminary suggestions about how each mini-theory might be useful or informative in other branches of personality. This special issue contains 9 articles, each of which makes its own attempt to newly link its area of personality research to SDT. Even if SDT is not the appropriate seed for greater consilience in personality psychology, we urge the field not to neglect the search for unifying principles (Sheldon, Chen, & Hilpert, 2011); it may finally be time to renew the search for a "grand theory" in personality. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

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