His work focuses on identity politics, political psychology, electoral politics, and ethnic conflicts. His doctoral research probes the relationship between the linguistic vitality of Western minorities, intergroup attitudes, and conflict intensity. He is also a research assistant with the Canadian Electoral Study.

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Infections and deaths associated with COVID-19 show a high degree of heterogeneity across different populations. A thorough understanding of population-level predictors of such outcomes is crucial for devising better-targeted and more appropriate public health preparedness measures. While demographic, economic, and health-system capacity have featured prominently in recent work, cultural, and behavioral characteristics have largely been overlooked. However, cultural differences shape both the public policy response and individuals' behavioral responses to the crisis in ways that can impact infection dynamics and key health outcomes. To address this gap, we used meta-analytic methods to explore the global variability of three public health outcomes (i.e., crude test positivity, case/infection fatality, and mortality risk) during the first wave of the pandemic. This set of analyses identified several cultural/behavioral attributes (e.g., uncertainty avoidance and long-term vs. short-term normative orientation) as independent predictors of public health outcomes after adjusting for key demographic, political, economic, and health-system-related predictors; which were robust in sensitivity analyses. In conclusion, this study clearly demonstrates that cultural attributes do in fact account for some of the global disparities in COVID-19-attributed health outcomes. As a consequence, policymakers should more explicitly consider a society's cultural attributes alongside other important parameters such as demographic characteristics and health system constraints in order to develop better tailored and more effective policy responses.

LGBTQ activists and academics advocate the use of non-binary gender categories to include individuals who identify as neither rigidly male nor rigidly female to reflect the increasing number of people who do not place themselves in these two conventional classes. Although some general-population surveys have begun using non-binary gender questions, research has not examined the consequences of using (or not) a question with non-binary gender categories in surveys and censuses. Our study addresses this gap using a survey experiment in which respondents in the United States, Canada, and Sweden randomly received a binary or a non-binary gender question. We find no evidence of negative reactions to the non-binary question. Moreover, when there is a statistical difference, the reactions are positive. We thus conclude that general-population surveys could use a non-binary question without facing significant adverse reactions from respondents.

The 2011 Canadian federal election results changed the face of federal politics in Quebec. In a sudden and spectacular reversal of electoral fortunes, BQ support crumbled while that of the NDP surged. While most commentators focused exclusively on the 2011 election itself to explain what had happened, we offer an interpretation that takes a longitudinal approach. Using data from the Canadian Election Study and political party manifestos from 2006 to 2011, we propose a three-dimensional proximity model of voter/party congruence to explore the evolution of the ideological stances of Quebec voters and parties. Empirical results suggest these ideological distances between the NDP and Quebec voters decreased over time, whereas the BQ has distanced itself from voters. Furthermore, ideological distances between party and voters are a significant predictor of vote.

Are Eurosceptic parties more likely to run negative, uncivil and emotional campaigns, as it is often intuitively argued? And with what consequences? In this article, we shed light on the effectiveness of these campaign strategies for Eurosceptic parties during the 2019 European elections. We argue that ‘harsher’ campaigns are ‘in character’ for Eurosceptic parties, and are as such more likely to be electorally successful for them. We use data from the 2019 European Parliament Elections Expert Survey, covering 191 unique parties, and show that, indeed, Eurosceptic parties are more likely to campaign in a harsh way, and more likely than Europhile parties to benefit electorally from it. All data and materials are openly available for replication.

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