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From the adoption of the shipping container to coordinated trade liberalization, reductions in trade costs have propelled modern globalization. In this paper, we analyse the application of blockchain to reduce the trade costs of producing and coordinating trusted information along supply chains. Consumers, producers, and governments increasingly demand information about the quality, characteristics, and provenance of traded goods. Partially due to the risks of error and fraud, this information is costly to produce and to maintain between dispersed parties. Recent efforts have sought to overcome these costs-such as paperless trade agendas-through the application of new technologies. Our focus is on how blockchain technology can form a new decentralized economic infrastructure for supply chains by governing decentralized dynamic ledgers of information about goods as they move. We outline the potential economic consequences of blockchain supply chains before examining policy. Effective adoption faces a range of policy challenges including regulatory recognition and interoperability across jurisdictions. We propose a high-level policy ---This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to conceptualise the chief aspects of policy interest in blockchain technology. Design/methodology/approach The paper outlines policymaking processes in the context of innovation and technological change, assesses generic variations in policy treatment towards blockchain, and identifies manifestations of policy entrepreneurship using national case studies of blockchain policies. Findings Favourable policy dispositions towards blockchain technology are interpreted as political efforts to develop local, blockchain-enabled economies. So-called “crypto-friendly” jurisdictions proactively clarify regulatory and tax treatments of cryptocurrency and other blockchain applications, and trial blockchain uses in fields predominated by public sector activity. Policymakers in countries hostile towards blockchain-related activity have instigated bans or strict limitations with respect to blockchain engagement by developers and users. Research limitations/implications Reliance upon case studies suggests the need for alternative study approaches (e.g. index construction, empirical research) as blockchain use consolidates throughout the global economy. Practical implications This paper provides insight to policymakers and blockchain practitioners regarding the attributes of accommodative policies towards distributed ledger technology. Social implications Countries and sub-national regions exhibiting a more welcoming policy stance are more likely to attract entrepreneurs and investors in the crypto-economic blockchain space. Originality/value This paper develops a policy “crypto-friendliness” construct to assess the extent to which policymakers enact accommodative policies for blockchain development.

We provide a survey of blockchain's potential to propel private entrepreneurial discovery of institutions that challenge state hegemony. We introduce institutional cryptoeconomics, and then we describe blockchain as a technology that increases the opportunity set of entrepreneurial action. We then survey blockchain's potential to challenge state hegemony in five socioeconomic areas. We also discuss some implications of blockchainbased economic infrastructure for public policy and regulation. These contributions suggest an increasing scope for entrepreneurial action using blockchain to challenge state hegemony. They also suggest a necessary shift in the provision of public goods and government regulatory control.

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Trust is a fundamental precondition underpinning exchange and economic coordination but is costly to maintain. Given the potential for agents to enjoy zero-sum gains by opportunistically betraying the trust of exchanging counterparties, an edifice of occupational roles, organizational forms and institutional practices have emerged in an effort to uphold trust. In simple terms, there exists a "cost of trust." This paper provides numerical estimates of the cost of trust for the United States economy, based on an attribution of labor force occupational data with varying degrees of trust-maintenance. Occupations represented in high cost-of-trust activities include managers, lawyers and judges, tax professionals, accountants and auditors. Overall, it is estimated that the cost of trust accounts for 35 per cent of U.S. employment in 2010. The cost of trust has significant implications for the economic applicability of blockchain compared with conventional forms of ledger technology largely maintained by centralized third-party organizations.

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