I study the effects of the 2020 coronavirus outbreak in the United States and subsequent fiscal policy response in a nonlinear DSGE model. The pandemic is a shock to the utility of contact-intensive services that propagates to other sectors via general equilibrium, triggering a deep recession. I use a calibrated version of the model that matches the path of the US unemployment rate in 2020 to analyze different types of fiscal policies. I find that the pandemic shock changes the ranking of policy multipliers. Unemployment benefits are the most effective tool to stabilize income for borrowers, who are the hardest hit during a pandemic, while liquidity assistance programs are the most effective if the policy objective is to stabilize employment in the affected sector. I also study the effects of the ✩2.2 trillion CARES Act of 2020.

We measure labor demand and supply shocks at the sector level around the COVID-19 outbreak by estimating a Bayesian structural vector autoregression on monthly statistics of hours worked and real wages. Most sectors were subject to large negative labor supply and demand shocks in March and April, with substantial heterogeneity in the size of shocks across sectors. Our estimates suggest that two-thirds of the drop in the aggregate growth rate of hours in March and April 2020 are attributable to labor supply. We validate our estimates of supply shocks by showing that they are correlated with sectoral measures of telework.

I n response to the COVID-19 outbreak, public health authorities around the world implemented mitigation measures such as social distancing, which shut down entire sectors of the economy, especially those that involve interpersonal contact, such as restaurants and salons. While authorities have forced many such establishments to close, leaving many workers jobless, and issued stay-at home orders (so-called lockdowns), consumers also decreased their use of these services. 1 Further, newly jobless workers reduced their consumption of all goods and services.

We study the design of lender of last resort interventions and show that the provision of long-term liquidity incentivizes purchases of high-yield short-term securities by banks. Using a unique security-level data set, we find that the European Central Bank's three-year Long-Term Refinancing Operation caused Portuguese banks to purchase short-term domestic government bonds that could be pledged to obtain central bank liquidity. This "collateral trade" effect is large, as banks purchased short-term bonds equivalent to 10.6% of amounts outstanding. The steepening of peripheral sovereign yield curves after the policy announcement is consistent with the equilibrium effects of the collateral trade.

We study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises. Providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets, but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs. In our model governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons. A fiscal backstop mitigates the risk of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy. Our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informative stress tests, and, paradoxically, how they can end up spending less than governments that are more fiscally constrained.