Blockchain interoperability is emerging as one of the crucial features of blockchain technology, but the knowledge necessary for achieving it is fragmented. This fact makes it challenging for academics and the industry to achieve interoperability among blockchains seamlessly. Given this new domain’s novelty and potential, we conduct a literature review on blockchain interoperability by collecting 284 papers and 120 grey literature documents, constituting a corpus of 404 documents. From those 404 documents, we systematically analyzed and discussed 102 documents, including peer-reviewed papers and grey literature. Our review classifies studies in three categories: Public Connectors, Blockchain of Blockchains, and Hybrid Connectors. Each category is further divided into sub-categories based on defined criteria. We classify 67 existing solutions in one sub-category using the Blockchain Interoperability Framework, providing a holistic overview of blockchain interoperability. Our findings show that blockchain interoperability has a much broader spectrum than cryptocurrencies and cross-chain asset transfers. Finally, this article discusses supporting technologies, standards, use cases, open challenges, and future research directions, paving the way for research in the area.

We present two asynchronous Byzantine fault-tolerant state machine replication (BFT) algorithms, which improve previous algorithms in terms of several metrics. First, they require only 2f + 1 replicas, instead of the usual 3f + 1. Second, the trusted service in which this reduction of replicas is based is quite simple, making a verified implementation straightforward (and even feasible using commercial trusted hardware). Third, in nice executions the two algorithms run in the minimum number of communication steps for non-speculative and speculative algorithms, respectively 4 and 3 steps. Besides the obvious benefits in terms of cost, resilience and management complexity-fewer replicas to tolerate a certain number of faults-our algorithms are simpler than previous ones, being closer to crash fault-tolerant replication algorithms. The performance evaluation shows that, even with the trusted component access overhead, they can have better throughput than Castro and Liskov's PBFT, and better latency in networks with non-negligible communication delays.

This paper proposes a hierarchy of three Byzantine-resistant protocols aimed to be used in practical distributed systems: multi-valued consensus, vector consensus and atomic broadcast. These protocols are designed as successive transformations from one to another. The first protocol, multi-valued consensus, is implemented on top of a randomized binary consensus. The protocols share a set of important structural properties. Firstly, they do not use signatures obtained with public-key cryptography, a well-known performance bottleneck in this kind of protocols. Secondly, they are time-free, i.e., they make no synchrony assumptions, since these assumptions are often vulnerable to subtle but effective attacks. Thirdly, they have no leaders, thus avoiding the cost of detecting corrupt processes. Fourthly, they have optimal resilience, i.e., they tolerate f = n−1 3 out of a total of n processes. The multi-valued consensus protocol terminates in a constant expected number of rounds, while the vector consensus and atomic broadcast protocols have time complexities O(f). * This work was partially supported by the FCT through project POSI/CHS/39815/2001 (COPE) and the Large-Scale Informatic Systems Laboratory (LASIGE). 1 We follow the recent literature that uses interchangeably the terms 'Byzantine faults' and 'intrusions', or 'Byzantine-resistant' and 'intrusion-tolerant'. However, papers like [25, 21] consider accidental Byzantine faults, which are different from malicious Byzantine faults, i.e., intrusions. These latter faults should not be assumed to happen independently.

There is a significant body of research on distributed computing architectures, methodologies and algorithms, both in the fields of fault tolerance and security. Whilst they have taken separate paths until recently, the problems to be solved are of similar nature. In classical dependability, fault tolerance has been the workhorse of many solutions. Classical security-related work has on the other hand privileged, with few exceptions, intrusion prevention. Intrusion tolerance (IT) is a new approach that has slowly emerged during the past decade, and gained impressive momentum recently. Instead of trying to prevent every single intrusion, these are allowed, but tolerated: the system triggers mechanisms that prevent the intrusion from generating a system security failure. The paper describes the fundamental concepts behind IT, tracing their connection with classical fault tolerance and security. We discuss the main strategies and mechanisms for architecting IT systems, and report on recent advances on distributed IT system architectures.