Summary Background In countries with declining numbers of confirmed cases of COVID-19, lockdown measures are gradually being lifted. However, even if most physical distancing measures are continued, other public health measures will be needed to control the epidemic. Contact tracing via conventional methods or mobile app technology is central to control strategies during de-escalation of physical distancing. We aimed to identify key factors for a contact tracing strategy to be successful. Methods We evaluated the impact of timeliness and completeness in various steps of a contact tracing strategy using a stochastic mathematical model with explicit time delays between time of infection and symptom onset, and between symptom onset, diagnosis by testing, and isolation (testing delay). The model also includes tracing of close contacts (eg, household members) and casual contacts, followed by testing regardless of symptoms and isolation if testing positive, with different tracing delays and coverages. We computed effective reproduction numbers of a contact tracing strategy ( R CTS ) for a population with physical distancing measures and various scenarios for isolation of index cases and tracing and quarantine of their contacts. Findings For the most optimistic scenario (testing and tracing delays of 0 days and tracing coverage of 100%), and assuming that around 40% of transmissions occur before symptom onset, the model predicts that the estimated effective reproduction number of 1·2 (with physical distancing only) will be reduced to 0·8 (95% CI 0·7–0·9) by adding contact tracing. The model also shows that a similar reduction can be achieved when testing and tracing coverage is reduced to 80% ( R CTS 0·8, 95% CI 0·7–1·0). A testing delay of more than 1 day requires the tracing delay to be at most 1 day or tracing coverage to be at least 80% to keep R CTS below 1. With a testing delay of 3 days or longer, even the most efficient strategy cannot reach R CTS values below 1. The effect of minimising tracing delay (eg, with app-based technology) declines with decreasing coverage of app use, but app-based tracing alone remains more effective than conventional tracing alone even with 20% coverage, reducing the reproduction number by 17·6% compared with 2·5%. The proportion of onward transmissions per index case that can be prevented depends on testing and tracing delays, and given a 0-day tracing delay, ranges from up to 79·9% with a 0-day testing delay to 41·8% with a 3-day testing delay and 4·9% with a 7-day testing delay. Interpretation In our model, minimising testing delay had the largest impact on reducing onward transmissions. Optimising testing and tracing coverage and minimising tracing delays, for instance with app-based technology, furth...
An epidemic of high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) A virus subtype H7N7 occurred in The Netherlands in 2003 that affected 255 flocks and led to the culling of 30 million birds. To evaluate the effectiveness of the control measures, we quantified between-flock transmission characteristics of the virus in 2 affected areas, using the reproduction ratio Rh. The control measures markedly reduced the transmission of HPAI virus: Rh before detection of the outbreak in the first infected flock was 6.5 (95% confidence interval [CI], 3.1-9.9) in one area and 3.1 in another area, and it decreased to 1.2 (95% CI, 0.6-1.9) after detection of the first outbreak in both areas. The observation that Rh remained >1 suggests that the containment of the epidemic was probably due to the reduction in the number of susceptible flocks by complete depopulation of the infected areas rather than to the reduction of the transmission by the other control measures.
Devastating epidemics of highly contagious animal diseases such as avian influenza, classical swine fever, and foot-and-mouth disease underline the need for improved understanding of the factors promoting the spread of these pathogens. Here the authors present a spatial analysis of the between-farm transmission of a highly pathogenic H7N7 avian influenza virus that caused a large epidemic in The Netherlands in 2003. The authors developed a method to estimate key parameters determining the spread of highly transmissible animal diseases between farms based on outbreak data. The method allows for the identification of high-risk areas for propagating spread in an epidemiologically underpinned manner. A central concept is the transmission kernel, which determines the probability of pathogen transmission from infected to uninfected farms as a function of interfarm distance. The authors show how an estimate of the transmission kernel naturally provides estimates of the critical farm density and local reproduction numbers, which allows one to evaluate the effectiveness of control strategies. For avian influenza, the analyses show that there are two poultry-dense areas in The Netherlands where epidemic spread is possible, and in which local control measures are unlikely to be able to halt an unfolding epidemic. In these regions an epidemic can only be brought to an end by the depletion of susceptible farms by infection or massive culling. The analyses provide an estimate of the spatial range over which highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses spread between farms, and emphasize that control measures aimed at controlling such outbreaks need to take into account the local density of farms.
The emergence and global impact of the novel influenza A(H1N1)v highlights the continuous threat to public health posed by a steady stream of new and unexpected infectious disease outbreaks in animals and humans. Once an emerging epidemic is detected, public health authorities will attempt to mitigate the epidemic by, among other measures, reducing further spread as much as possible. Scarce and/or costly control measures such as vaccines, anti-infective drugs, and social distancing must be allocated while epidemiological characteristics of the disease remain uncertain. Here we present first principles for allocating scarce resources with limited data. We show that under a broad class of assumptions, the simple rule of targeting intervention measures at the group with the highest risk of infection per individual will achieve the largest reduction in the transmission potential of a novel infection. For vaccination of susceptible persons, the appropriate risk measure is force of infection; for social distancing, the appropriate risk measure is incidence of infection. Unlike existing methods that rely on detailed knowledge of group-specific transmission rates, the method described here can be implemented using only data that are readily available during an epidemic, and allows ready adaptation as the epidemic progresses. The need to observe risk of infection helps to focus the ongoing planning and design of new infectious disease surveillance programs; from the presented first principles for allocating scarce resources, we can adjust the prioritization of groups for intervention when new observations on an emerging epidemic become available.
Newcastle disease is an economically important disease of poultry for which vaccination is applied as a preventive measure in many countries. Nevertheless, outbreaks have been reported in vaccinated populations. This suggests that either the vaccination coverage level is too low or that vaccination does not provide perfect immunity, allowing the virus to spread in partially vaccinated populations. Here we study the requirements of an epidemiologically effective vaccination program against Newcastle disease in poultry, based on data from experimental transmission studies. The transmission studies indicate that vaccinated birds with low or undetectable antibody titres may be protected against disease and mortality but that infection and transmission may still occur. In fact, our quantitative analyses show that Newcastle disease virus is highly transmissible in poultry with low antibody titres. As a consequence, herd immunity can only be achieved if a high proportion of birds (>85%) have a high antibody titre (log 2 haemagglutination inhibition titre ≥3) after vaccination. We discuss the implications for the control of Newcastle disease in poultry by vaccination.
BackgroundWe aimed to detect SARS-CoV-2 serum antibodies in the general population of the Netherlands and identify risk factors for seropositivity amidst the first COVID-19 epidemic wave.MethodsParticipants (n=3207, aged 2–90 years), enrolled from a previously established nationwide serosurveillance study, provided a self-collected fingerstick blood sample and completed a questionnaire (median inclusion date 3 April 2020). IgG antibodies targeted against the spike S1-protein of SARS-CoV-2 were quantified using a validated multiplex-immunoassay. Seroprevalence was estimated controlling for survey design, individual pre-pandemic concentration, and test performance. Random-effects logistic regression identified risk factors for seropositivity.ResultsOverall seroprevalence in the Netherlands was 2.8% (95% CI 2.1 to 3.7), with no differences between sexes or ethnic background, and regionally ranging between 1.3 and 4.0%. Estimates were highest among 18–39 year-olds (4.9%), and lowest in children 2–17 years (1.7%). Multivariable analysis revealed that persons taking immunosuppressants and those from the Orthodox-Reformed Protestant community had over four times higher odds of being seropositive compared to others. Anosmia/ageusia was the most discriminative symptom between seropositive (53%) and seronegative persons (4%, p<0.0001). Antibody concentrations in seropositive persons were significantly higher in those with fever or dyspnoea in contrast to those without (p=0.01 and p=0.04, respectively).ConclusionsIn the midst of the first epidemic wave, 2.8% of the Dutch population was estimated to be infected with SARS-CoV-2, that is, 30 times higher than reported. This study identified independent groups with increased odds for seropositivity that may require specific surveillance measures to guide future protective interventions internationally, including vaccination once available.
Despite considerable research efforts, little is yet known about key epidemiological parameters of H5N1 highly pathogenic influenza viruses in their avian hosts. Here we show how these parameters can be estimated using a limited number of birds in experimental transmission studies. Our quantitative estimates, based on Bayesian methods of inference, reveal that (i) the period of latency of H5N1 influenza virus in unvaccinated chickens is short (mean: 0.24 days; 95% credible interval: 0.099–0.48 days); (ii) the infectious period of H5N1 virus in unvaccinated chickens is approximately 2 days (mean: 2.1 days; 95%CI: 1.8–2.3 days); (iii) the reproduction number of H5N1 virus in unvaccinated chickens need not be high (mean: 1.6; 95%CI: 0.90–2.5), although the virus is expected to spread rapidly because it has a short generation interval in unvaccinated chickens (mean: 1.3 days; 95%CI: 1.0–1.5 days); and (iv) vaccination with genetically and antigenically distant H5N2 vaccines can effectively halt transmission. Simulations based on the estimated parameters indicate that herd immunity may be obtained if at least 80% of chickens in a flock are vaccinated. We discuss the implications for the control of H5N1 avian influenza virus in areas where it is endemic.
There is a consensus that mass vaccination against SARS-CoV-2 will ultimately end the COVID-19 pandemic. However, it is not clear when and which control measures can be relaxed during the rollout of vaccination programmes. We investigate relaxation scenarios using an age-structured transmission model that has been fitted to age-specific seroprevalence data, hospital admissions, and projected vaccination coverage for Portugal. Our analyses suggest that the pressing need to restart socioeconomic activities could lead to new pandemic waves, and that substantial control efforts prove necessary throughout 2021. Using knowledge on control measures introduced in 2020, we anticipate that relaxing measures completely or to the extent as in autumn 2020 could launch a wave starting in April 2021. Additional waves could be prevented altogether if measures are relaxed as in summer 2020 or in a step-wise manner throughout 2021. We discuss at which point the control of COVID-19 would be achieved for each scenario.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.