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This paper examines how personal bankruptcy and bankruptcy exemptions affect the supply and demand for credit. While generous state-level bankruptcy exemptions are probably viewed by most policymakers as benefiting less-well-off borrowers, our results using data from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances suggest they increase the amount of credit held by high-asset households and reduce the availability and amount of credit to low-asset households, conditioning on observable characteristics. We also find evidence that interest rates on automobile loans for lowasset households are higher in high exemption states. Thus, bankruptcy exemptions redistribute credit toward borrowers with high assets.

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Hamilton (1982) first argued that urban workers' commuting journeys are so long that the monocentric urban models literature has little predictive value concerning commuting. In this paper I re-interpret the definition of "wasteful commuting" to include only the amount of commuting that could be eliminated if workers traded jobs or houses, holding fixed the existing spatial patterns of jobs and housing and the actual urban transportation network in the urban area. Using an assignment model to calculate new estimates of the amount of wasteful commuting, I find that "waste" constitutes only a minor fraction-11%-of the total amount of commuting by workers in U.S. cities, rather than the extremely high 87% figure found by Hamilton.

The U.S. personal bankruptcy system functions as a bankruptcy system for small businesses as well as consumers, because debts of non-corporate firms are personal liabilities of the firms' owners. If the firm fails, the owner has an incentive to file for bankruptcy, since both business debts and the owner's personal debts will be discharged. In bankruptcy, the owner must give up assets above a fixed exemption level. Because exemption levels are set by the states, they vary widely. We show that higher bankruptcy exemption levels benefit potential entrepreneurs who are risk averse by providing partial wealth insurance and therefore the probability of owning a business increases as the exemption level rises. We test this prediction and find that the probability of households owning businesses is 35% higher if they live in states with unlimited rather than low exemptions. We also find that the probability of starting a business and the probability of owning a corporate rather than non-corporate business are higher for households that live in high exemption states.

In this paper, we investigate how personal bankruptcy law affects small firms' access to credit. When a firm is unincorporated, its debts are personal liabilities of the firm's owner, so that lending to the firm is legally equivalent to lending to its owner. If the firm fails, the owner has an incentive to file for personal bankruptcy, since the firm's debts will be discharged and the owner is only obliged to use assets above an exemption level to repay creditors. The higher the exemption level, the greater is the incentive to file for bankruptcy. We show that supply of credit falls and demand for credit rises when non-corporate firms are located in states with higher bankruptcy exemptions. We test the model and find that, if small firms are located in states with unlimited rather than low homestead exemptions, they are more likely to be denied credit, they receive smaller loans and interest rates are higher. Results for non-corporate versus corporate firms suggest that lenders often disregard small firms' organizational status in making loan decisions.

SummaryBackground-Spinal and bulbar muscular atrophy (SBMA) is caused by polyglutamine expansion in the androgen receptor, which results in ligand-dependent toxicity. Animal models have a neuromuscular deficit that is mitigated by androgen-reducing treatment.

Drivers have been running an "arms race" on American roads by buying increasingly large vehicles such as sport utility vehicles and light trucks. But large vehicles pose an increased danger to occupants of smaller vehicles and to pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorcyclists. This paper measures both the internal effect of large vehicles on their own occupants' safety and their external effect on others. The results show that light trucks are extremely deadly. For each 1 million light trucks that replace cars, between 34 and 93 additional car occupants, pedestrians, bicyclists, or motorcyclists are killed per year, and the value of the lives lost is between $242 and $652 million per year. The safety gain that families obtain for themselves from driving large vehicles comes at a very high cost: for each fatal crash that occupants of large vehicles avoid, at least 4.3 additional fatal crashes involving others occur.