We build a statistical ensemble representation of two economic models describing respectively, in simplified terms, a payment system and a credit market. To this purpose we adopt the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution where the role of the Hamiltonian is taken by the total money supply (i.e. including money created from debt) of a set of * Corresponding author 1 interacting economic agents. As a result, we can read the main thermodynamic quantities in terms of monetary ones. In particular, we define for the credit market model a work term which is related to the impact of monetary policy on credit creation. Furthermore, with our formalism we recover and extend some results concerning the temperature of an economic system, previously presented in the literature by considering only the monetary base as conserved quantity. Finally, we study the statistical ensemble for the Pareto distribution.
We maximize the expected utility from terminal wealth for an HARA investor when the market price of risk is an unobservable random variable. We compute the optimal portfolio explicitly and explore the effects of learning by comparing it with the corresponding myopic policy. In particular, we show that, for a market price of risk constant in sign, the ratio between the portfolio under partial observation and its myopic counterpart increases with respect to risk tolerance. As a consequence, the absolute value of the partial observation case is larger (smaller) than the myopic one if the investor is more (less) risk tolerant than the logarithmic investor. Moreover, our explicit computations enable to study in details the so called hedging demand induced by learning about market price of risk.
We analyze and quantify, in a financial market with parameter uncertainty and for a Constant Relative Risk Aversion investor, the utility effects of two different boundedly rational (i.e., sub-optimal) investment strategies (namely, myopic and unconditional strategies) and compare them between each other and with the utility effect of full information. We show that effects are mainly caused by full information and predictability, being the effect of learning marginal. We also investigate the saver's decision of whether to manage her/his portfolio personally (DIY investor ) or hire, against the payment of a management fee, a professional investor and find that delegation is mainly motivated by the belief that professional advisors are, depending on investment horizon and risk aversion, either better informed ("insiders") or more capable of gathering and processing information rather than their ability of learning from financial data. In particular, for very short investment horizons, delegation is primarily, if not exclusively, motivated by the beliefs that professional investors are better informed.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.