WstępWśród wielu metafor określających relacje rosyjsko-chińskie jedna zdaje się szczególnie adekwatna. Jest to stwierdzenie, że Rosjanie grają w szachy, a Chińczycy w weiji ("chińskie szachy", znane w Polsce lepiej pod japońską nazwą go) 1 . Podstawowe różnice między tymi grami dobrze pokazują odmienne style prowadzenia polityki między Rosją a Chinami.W szachach gra toczy się o zupełne zwycięstwo -celem jest pokonanie przeciwnika, ustawienie go w pozycji bez wyjścia. Zwycięstwo jednej strony oznacza klęskę drugiej. Wiktoria następuje dzięki całkowitemu zniszczeniu zasobów przeciwnika lub dzięki genialnemu kunsztowi gracza. Alternatywą dla rozstrzygnięcia jest pat, oznaczający, że żadna ze stron nie wygrała. W szachach cały czas widać ruchy przeciwnika, figury przeciwnika są rozstawione, eliminuje się je stopniowo w kolejnych starciach. Widząc potencjał, łatwiej można przewidywać posunięcia oponenta, a przede wszystkim starać się zadać mu decydujący cios. Szachy uczą determinacji i kształtują myślenie w kategoriach decydujących rozgrywek. Jest to zgodne z rosyjską mentalnością, odwołującą się do monoteistycznych koncepcji uniwersalnych wartości, dychotomii dobra i zła.Go z kolei, której nazwa po chińsku oznacza "grę otaczających pionków", świetnie ukazuje podstawową chińską cechę, jaką jest względność. Nie ma jednej prawdy absolutnej, świat składa się z nachodzących na siebie i uzupełniających się przeciwności i podlega ciągłej przemianie. W go pojedynki toczą się równolegle, w różnych częściach planszy, a przewagę osiąga się stopniowo, poprzez cierpliwą i konsekwentnie budowaną strategię. To powoduje długie kampanie, konieczność powolnego zajmowania pustych obszarów na planszy i tym samym stopniowego zmniejszania potencjalnych ruchów przeciwnika. Go uczy umiejęt-1
It is proper to start acknowledgments from mentioning Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. I want to thank her once again for agreeing to talk to me. The first time was in Warsaw in September 2013, on the sidelines of her meetings with top Polish politicians and during a dinner, which she hosted for civil society activists. The second time, was through an individual, one-to-one interview in Naypyidaw in February 2015. These encounters were priceless for me to understand her as a politician. Although I'm not uncritical of her, I must admit she is the most classy politician I have ever met. She is a person that intellectually and aesthetically belongs to bygone era. She resides in times where politics was not necessarily less brutal, but certainly better mannered.My dear wife, Magdalena Kozłowska was once again extremely supportive, empa thetic, patient and understanding about my work: this is my eighth book she has had to cope with. It was during our home 'seminars' that the central idea for this bookthe concept of hybridity -was developed. Professor Salvatore Babones from University of Sydney never ceased to encourage me to carry on, never mind what, and not to give up. When I almost capitulated on this project, he did not. So, without him, quite literally, this book would not have materialized. In a similar manner I want to thank Dorothea Schaefter from Routledge, who risked and trusted an unknown scholar and, by doing so, she made this book possible. If there was one person who helped the most during my book-writing it was Derek Tonkin, a former British diplomat, Ambassador to Southeast Asian countries. Our regular correspondence about Myanmar was priceless. His intellectual guidance, valuable advice, sober comments and recom mendations all helped immeasurably. Derek also read the full manuscript and without his comments it would have been much less of a book. Anna Zongollowicz is yet another person I feel grateful towards. I miss our discussions about Suu Kyi in Yangon and Bangkok. Ania read the two first chapters of this book and her comments not only spared me a few errors but influenced some important ideas. A writer and Acknowledgements vii journalist Mon Mon Myat has been relentless in her defence of Suu Kyi, which I respect. Meetings and correspondence with her served as a counterbalance for critical voices about Myanmar's leader, which I gathered from elsewhere. She tried her best to convince me of the ontological benevolence of Suu Kyi. Our honest disagreements about Suu Kyi helped us both make our arguments stronger. Conversations with Chosein Yamahata, a professor from Aichi Gakuin University in Nagoya, Japan, are always refreshing and nonobvious. His unique perspective brought in many new ideas. I appreciate all time he spent explaining Burmese politics to me and all the con ferences, panels and forums he organized. Ye Min Zaw, the Burmese language trans lator of my previous book (on Suu Kyi's political thought), is the person I would talk to (or ratherlisten to) about Rakhine and Shan. Ye has two rare features: i...
In political science an accent on individuals (political leaders) in researching politics is neither popular nor advocated one. In authoritarian countries like Russia or China, however, political leaders and their personalities are a crucial factor in trying to understand the political processes there. Both Vladimir Putin in Russia and Xi Jinping in China have dominated their respective political systems. This, combined with good state of Russia-China relations makes it an interesting case study of the influence of political leaders on authoritarian countries. Both Putin and Xi are new type of leaders: they both follow the main ideas of political realism (though with "national differences") and they share a 19 th century outlook on the global affairs ("concert of powers") yet they use contemporary means to fulfil these interests. Their personal understanding provides a predictability and stability: both Putin and Xi function in accordance with balance of power and respect for zones of influence concepts. That is why differences in other spheres, like Russia's and China's approaches to the USA do not influence the general good mood of Sino-Russian relationship.
This article deals with public, political discourse over One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative in Poland. OBOR has recently become very popular in Poland as it encapsulates the noticeable fascination on China and on geopolitics among parts of Polish society. This article describes this phenomenon and delaminates the mainstream political discourse over OBOR into two main strands: great geopolitical and/or geoeconomic chance (pro-OBOR discourse) and security threat (anti-OBOR). The advocates of the former see the project as a great geopolitical and economic opportunity for Poland; the supporters of the latter find it a threat to Polish security and/or economic interests. This discourse echoes internal divisions within current Polish government on its China policy and can be observed against the background of China's dynamic enter to Central and Eastern Europe, particularly to Czech Republic, Hungary and Serbia.
No abstract
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