Abstract. We consider two risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of an illiquid indivisible contingent claim in an incomplete semimartingale market environment. Under the assumption that the agents are exponential utility maximizers with non-traded random endowments, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for negotiation to be successful, i.e., for the trade to occur. We also study the asymptotic case where the size of the claim is small compared to the random endowments and we give a full characterization in this case.Finally, we study a partial-equilibrium problem for a bundle of divisible claims and establish existence and uniqueness. A number of technical results on conditional indifference prices is provided.

We study utility indifference prices and optimal purchasing quantities for a contingent claim, in an incomplete semi-martingale market, in the presence of vanishing hedging errors and/or risk aversion.Assuming that the average indifference price converges to a well defined limit, we prove that optimally taken positions become large in absolute value at a specific rate. We draw motivation from and make connections to Large Deviations theory, and in particular, the celebrated Gärtner-Ellis theorem. We analyze a series of well studied examples where this limiting behavior occurs, such as fixed markets with vanishing risk aversion, the basis risk model with high correlation, models of large markets with vanishing trading restrictions and the Black-Scholes-Merton model with either vanishing default probabilities or vanishing transaction costs. Lastly, we show that the large claim regime could naturally arise in partial equilibrium models.

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Abstract. In a Markovian stochastic volatility model, we consider financial agents whose investment criteria are modelled by forward exponential performance processes. The problem of contingent claim indifference valuation is first addressed and a number of properties are proved and discussed. Special attention is given to the comparison between the forward exponential and the backward exponential utility indifference valuation. In addition, we construct the problem of optimal risk sharing in this forward setting and solve it when the agents' forward performance criteria are exponential.

The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. In this paper, we propose a game where agents' strategic sets consist of all possible sharing securities and pricing kernels that are consistent with Arrow-Debreu sharing rules. First, it is shown that agents' best response problems have unique solutions. The risk-sharing Nash equilibrium admits a finite-dimensional characterisation, and it is proved to exist for an arbitrary number of agents and to be unique in the two-agent game. In equilibrium, agents declare beliefs on future random outcomes different from their actual probability assessments, and the risk-sharing securities are endogenously bounded, implying (among other things) loss of efficiency. In addition, an analysis regarding extremely risk-tolerant agents indicates that they profit more from the Nash risk-sharing equilibrium than compared to the Arrow-Debreu one. Keywords

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The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. In this paper, we propose a game where agents' strategic sets consist of all possible sharing securities and pricing kernels that are consistent with Arrow-Debreu sharing rules. First, it is shown that agents' best response problems have unique solutions. The risk-sharing Nash equilibrium admits a finite-dimensional characterisation, and it is proved to exist for an arbitrary number of agents and to be unique in the two-agent game. In equilibrium, agents declare beliefs on future random outcomes different from their actual probability assessments, and the risk-sharing securities are endogenously bounded, implying (among other things) loss of efficiency. In addition, an analysis regarding extremely risk-tolerant agents indicates that they profit more from the Nash risk-sharing equilibrium than compared to the Arrow-Debreu one. Keywords

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