Notwithstanding the significance of a positive bureaucratic reputation, the average bureau functions amidst deep-rooted public hostility. Bureaucracy bashing presumably weakens public sector employees' commitment to their bureaus, which is known to undermine public sector performance. Motivated by these concerns, this paper investigates whether exogenous signals regarding a bureau's reputation affect the organizational attachment - identification and commitment - of its employees, and the variation in employee responses. Employing an experiment at an Israeli welfare bureaucracy, we show that the organizational attachment of employees who feel central and influential within the bureau is unshaken, and even reinforced, in response to negative reputation signals. Conversely, employees who feel marginal and powerless are receptive to both negative and positive reputation signals. The implications of these findings are that public organizations can buffer their employees from the detrimental effects of negative reputation signals, yet by so doing they may shut out justified scrutiny and demands for change.

Exploiting rare access to doctors’ real-world judgments of incapacity benefits applications to an Israeli governmental program (2015-2017), we examine the prevalence and underlying mechanisms of discrimination against Muslims versus Jews. To mitigate confounding explanations for unequal treatment, we restrict the analysis to claimants whose applications passed a strict medical-disability threshold so that their medical condition was undisputed. Theoretically, we offer a comprehensive theoretical framework for possible micro-mechanisms underlying bureaucratic discrimination of minorities, the decision-environment conditions that instigate them, and observational implications for their decoding. Findings confirm that Jewish doctors were more likely to reject applications by Muslims and to recommend partial (but not full) compensation for Jews. Further, we empirically illustrate how our proposed theoretical framework can be employed to analyze which micro-mechanism is most likely to underlie discrimination and to empirically decipher among alternative explanations, demonstrating that bureaucratic discrimination, in this case, is best explained by implicit prejudice triggered under conditions of complexity and ambiguity that undermined doctors’ systematic processing of information.

Her research foci include bureaucratic agencies' identity, reputation, and responsiveness to public demands, civil servants' social identities and intergovernmental social networks, representative bureaucracy, discrimination of minorities, and citizen-state interactions.

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