American racism is alive and well. In this essay, we amass a large body of classic and contemporary research across multiple areas of psychology (e.g., cognitive, developmental, social), as well as the broader social sciences (e.g., sociology, communication studies, public policy), and humanities (e.g., critical race studies, history, philosophy), to outline seven factors that contribute to American racism: 1) Categories, which organize people into distinct groups by promoting essentialist and normative reasoning, 2) Factions, which trigger ingroup loyalty and intergroup competition and threat, 3) Segregation, which hardens racist perceptions, preferences, and beliefs through the denial of intergroup contact, 4) Hierarchy, which emboldens people to think, feel, and behave in racist ways, 5) Power, which legislates racism on both micro and macro levels, 6) Media, which legitimizes overrepresented and idealized representations of White Americans while marginalizing and minimizing people of color, and 7) Passivism, such that overlooking or denying the existence of racism obscures this reality, encouraging others to do the same and allowing racism to fester and persist. We argue that these and other factors support American racism, and conclude with suggestions for future research, particularly in the domain of identifying ways to promote anti-racism.

To investigate whether children rectify social inequalities in a resource allocation task, participants (N = 185 African-American and European-American 5–6 year-olds and 10–11 year-olds) witnessed an inequality of school supplies between peers of different racial backgrounds. Assessments were conducted on how children judged the wrongfulness of the inequality, allocated new resources to racial ingroup and outgroup recipients, evaluated alternative allocation strategies, and reasoned about their decisions. Younger children showed ingroup favorability; their responses differed depending on whether they had witnessed their ingroup or an outgroup at a disadvantage. With age, children increasingly reasoned about the importance of equal access to school supplies and correcting past disparities. Older children judged the resource inequality negatively, allocated more resources to the disadvantaged group, and positively evaluated the actions of others who did the same, regardless of whether they had seen their racial ingroup or an outgroup at a disadvantage. Thus, balancing moral and social group concerns enabled individuals to rectify inequalities and ensure fair access to important resources regardless of racial group membership.

The present study investigated age-related changes regarding children’s (N = 136) conceptions of fairness and others’ welfare in a merit-based resource allocation paradigm. To test whether children at 3- to 5-years-old and 6- to 8-years-old took others’ welfare into account when dividing resources, in addition to merit and equality concerns, children were asked to allocate, judge, and reason about allocations of necessary (needed to avoid harm) and luxury (enjoyable to have) resources to a hardworking and a lazy character. While 3- to 5-year-olds did not differentiate between distributing luxury and necessary resources, 6- to 8-year-olds allocated luxury resources more meritoriously than necessary resources. Further, children based their allocations of necessary resources on concerns for others’ welfare, rather than merit, even when one character was described as working harder. The findings revealed that, with age, children incorporated the concerns for others’ welfare and merit into their conceptions of fairness in a resource allocation context, and prioritized these concerns differently depending on whether they were allocating luxury or necessary resources. Further, with age, children weighed multiple moral concerns including equality, merit, and others’ welfare, when determining the fair allocation of resources.

In the context of a preexisting resource inequality, the concerns for strict equality (allocating the same number of resources to all recipients) conflict with the concerns for equity (allocating resources to rectify the inequality). The present study demonstrated age related changes in children’s (3- to 8-years-old, N = 133) ability to simultaneously weigh the concerns for equality and equity through the analysis of children’s judgments, allocations, and reasoning in the context of a preexisting inequality. Three- to 4-year-olds took equity into account in their judgments of allocations, but allocated resources equally in a behavioral task. In contrast, 5- to 6-year-olds rectified the inequality in their allocations, but judged both equitable and equal allocations to be fair. It was not until 7- to 8-years-old that children focused on rectifying the inequality in their allocations and judgments, as well as judged equal allocations less positively than equitable allocations, thereby demonstrating a more complete understanding of the necessity of rectifying inequalities. The novel findings revealed age related changes from 3- to 8-years-old regarding how the concerns for equity and equality develop, and how children’s judgments, allocations, and reasoning are coordinated when making allocation decisions.

This article introduces an accessible approach to implementing unmoderated remote research in developmental science-research in which children and families participate in studies remotely and independently, without directly interacting with researchers. Unmoderated remote research has the potential to strengthen developmental science by: (1) facilitating the implementation of studies that are easily replicable, (2) allowing for new approaches to longitudinal studies and studies of parent-child interaction, and (3) including families from more diverse backgrounds and children growing up in more diverse environments in research. We describe an approach we have used to design and implement unmoderated remote research that is accessible to researchers with limited programming expertise, and we describe the resources we have made available on a new website (discoveriesonline.org) to help researchers get started with implementing this approach. We discuss the potential of this method for developmental science and highlight some challenges still to be overcome to harness the power of unmoderated remote research for advancing the field. The field of cognitive development was founded upon remarkable insights gleaned from everyday interactions with children. Piaget's theory of cognitive development (1954) began with his observations of his own children playing on their mats, dropping things from their highchairs, and playing with marbles. Carey (1985) revolutionized our understanding of how concepts originate and change by analyzing conversations with her own child about birth, the nature of life, and death. The field is full of stories of great theoretical insights made by researchers closely watching children as they crawl around near the sides of high beds (Adolph, Kretch, & LoBue, 2014), negotiate the rules of games among themselves on a playground (Borman, 1981), and try to sit down on way-too-tiny toy tractors (DeLoache, 1987). Of course, the field has never relied on the observations of individual researchers alone. We use these observations to design experiments that recreate the situations in which the behaviors were first observed, which can then be replicated by labs around the world. But still, individual interactions between researchers and their participants have always been central to the field of cognitive development. The notion that we can learn from watching and interacting with children, along with the intriguing challenges of thinking about how to recreate the conditions of everyday life in CONTACT Marjorie Rhodes

Many people believe in equality of opportunity but overlook and minimize the structural factors that shape social inequalities in the United States and around the world, such as systematic exclusion (e.g., educational, occupational) based on group membership (e.g., gender, race, socioeconomic status). As a result, social inequalities persist and place marginalized social groups at elevated risk for negative emotional, learning, and health outcomes. Where do the beliefs and behaviors that underlie social inequalities originate? Recent evidence from developmental science indicates that an awareness of social inequalities begins in childhood and that children seek to explain the underlying causes of the disparities that they observe and experience. Moreover, children and adolescents show early capacities for understanding and rectifying inequalities when regulating access to resources in peer contexts. Drawing on a social reasoning developmental framework, we synthesize what is currently known about children’s and adolescents’ awareness, beliefs, and behavior concerning social inequalities and highlight promising avenues by which developmental science can help reduce harmful assumptions and foster a more just society.

This study investigated children's ability to distinguish between resource inequalities with individual versus structural origins. Children (3‐ to 8‐years‐old; N = 93) were presented with resource inequalities based on either recipients’ merit (individual factor) or gender (structural factor). Children were assessed on their expectations for others’ allocations, own allocations, reasoning, and evaluations of others’ allocations. Children perpetuated merit‐based inequalities and either rectified or allocated equally in response to gender‐based inequalities. Older, but not younger, children expected others to perpetuate both types of inequalities and differed in their evaluations and reasoning. Links between children's allocations and judgments were also found. Results reveal novel insights into children's developing consideration of the structural and individual factors leading to resource inequalities.

Social inequalities limit important opportunities and resources for members of marginalized and disadvantaged groups. Understanding the origins of how children construct their understanding of social inequalities in the context of their everyday peer interactions has the potential to yield novel insights into when-and how-individuals respond to different types of social inequalities. The present study examined whether children (N ϭ 176; 3-to 8-years-old; 52% female, 48% male; 70% European American, 16% African American, 10% Latinx, and 4% Asian American; middle-income backgrounds) differentiate between structurally based inequalities (e.g., based on gender) and individually based inequalities (e.g., based on merit). Children were randomly assigned to a group that received more (advantaged) or fewer (disadvantaged) resources than another group due to either their groups' meritorious performance on a task or the gender biases of the peer in charge of allocating resources. Overall, children evaluated structurally based inequalities to be more unfair and worthy of rectification than individually based inequalities, and disadvantaged children were more likely to view inequalities to be wrong and act to rectify them compared to advantaged children. With age, advantaged children became more likely to rectify the inequalities and judge perpetuating allocations to be unfair. Yet, the majority of children allocated equally in response to both types of inequality. The findings generated novel evidence regarding how children evaluate and respond to individually and structurally based inequalities, and how children's own status within the inequality informs these responses.