ABSTRACT:In this paper we investigate the reputational penalties to managers of firms announcing earnings restatements. More specifically, we examine management turnover and the subsequent employment of displaced managers at firms announcing earnings restatements during 1997 or 1998. In contrast to prior research (Beneish 1999; Agrawal et al. 1999), which does not find increased turnover following GAAP violations or revelation of corporate fraud, we find that 60 percent of restating firms experience a turnover of at least one top manager within 24 months of the restatement compared to 35 percent among age-, size-, and industry-matched firms. Moreover, the subsequent employment prospects of the displaced managers of restatement firms are poorer than those of the displaced managers of control firms. Our results hold after controlling for firm performance, bankruptcy, and other determinants of management turnover, and suggest that both corporate boards and the external labor market impose significant penalties on managers for violating GAAP. Also, in light of resource constraints at the SEC, our findings are encouraging as they suggest that private penalties for GAAP violations are severe and may serve as partial substitutes for public enforcement of GAAP violations.

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In this paper we investigate audit pricing for financial institutions. We modify the standard audit fee model for industrial companies by incorporating measures of risk and complexity that are either unique to or more relevant for banks, and that are used by bank regulatory agencies. For a sample of 277 financial institutions in fiscal 2000, we find that audit fees are higher for banks having more transactions accounts, fewer securities as a percentage of total assets, lower levels of efficiency, and higher degrees of credit risk. Higher fees also obtain for savings institutions, for banks that are more involved in acquisition activity, and for institutions that are required by regulatory agencies to maintain higher levels of risk-adjusted capital. Our model reveals that the complexities and risks deemed most important by regulatory agencies are also those that tend to be priced by audit firms. The importance of the audit process for banks is likely to intensify in the future as regulatory changes increase the importance of market discipline in controlling bank risk-taking.

SUMMARY: This paper examines IPO audit fees to assess the use of industry specialization as a differentiation strategy by audit firms. We extend existing theory on the impact of industry specialization on audit fees by incorporating Porter's (1985) theory of competition and differentiation. We suggest that market share enables audit firms to gain competitive advantages in terms of cost and service. However, the impact of such advantages on fees depends on whether the audit firm has successfully differentiated itself from competitors within client industries. Our results indicate that as audit firm industry market share increases without a differentiation in market share, the audit fee charged for a given IPO decreases. In the context of Porter (1985), this result suggests that the client is able to bargain for a portion of the auditor's cost savings because the audit firm has not successfully differentiated itself from competitors. In contrast, we show that audit firms that possess significantly higher market shares than their industry competitors earn fee premiums, suggesting that audit firms that have successfully differentiated themselves retain a stronger bargaining position with their clients.

We test the relationship between the change in a firm's cost of debt and the disclosure of a material weakness in an initial Section 404 report. We find that, on average, a firm's credit spread on its publicly traded debt marginally increases if it discloses a material weakness. We also examine the impact of monitoring by credit rating agencies and/or banks on this result and find that the result is more pronounced for firms that are not monitored. Additional analysis indicates that the effect of bank monitoring appears to be the primary driver of these monitoring results. This finding is consistent with the argument that banks are effective delegated monitors for the debt market. The results of this study suggest the need for future research, particularly to test the differential effects of monitoring on the cost of debt compared to the cost of equity.

SUMMARY: This study investigates whether auditor quality and audit committee expertise are associated with improved financial reporting timeliness as measured by the duration of a financial statement restatement's ''dark period.'' The restatement dark period represents the length of time between a company's discovery that it will need to restate financial data and the subsequent disclosure of the restatement's effect on earnings. For a sample of dark restatements disclosed between 2004 and 2009, we find that companies that engage Big 4 auditors have shorter dark periods than companies that do not engage Big 4 auditors. We also find that companies with more financial experts on the audit committee have shorter dark periods, but only when such financial expertise relates specifically to accounting. Finally, companies with audit committee chairs that have accounting financial expertise provide the most timely disclosures, as the dark periods for these firms are reduced by approximately 38 percent. Our results suggest that both auditor and audit committee expertise are associated with the timely disclosure of restatement details.

ABSTRACT:In this paper we investigate the reputational penalties to managers of firms announcing earnings restatements. More specifically, we examine management turnover and the subsequent employment of displaced managers at firms announcing earnings restatements during 1997 or 1998. In contrast to prior research (Beneish 1999; Agrawal et al. 1999), which does not find increased turnover following GAAP violations or revelation of corporate fraud, we find that 60 percent of restating firms experience a turnover of at least one top manager within 24 months of the restatement compared to 35 percent among age-, size-, and industry-matched firms. Moreover, the subsequent employment prospects of the displaced managers of restatement firms are poorer than those of the displaced managers of control firms. Our results hold after controlling for firm performance, bankruptcy, and other determinants of management turnover, and suggest that both corporate boards and the external labor market impose significant penalties on managers for violating GAAP. Also, in light of resource constraints at the SEC, our findings are encouraging as they suggest that private penalties for GAAP violations are severe and may serve as partial substitutes for public enforcement of GAAP violations.