How are people able to think about things they have never seen or touched? We demonstrate that abstract knowledge can be built analogically from more experience-based knowledge. People's understanding of the abstract domain of time, for example, is so intimately dependent on the more experience-based domain of space that when people make an air journey or wait in a lunch line, they also unwittingly (and dramatically) change their thinking about time. Further, our results suggest that it is not sensorimotor spatial experience per se that influences people's thinking about time, but rather people's representations of and thinking about their spatial experience.

Symbols enable people to organize and communicate about the world. However, the ways in which symbolic knowledge is learned and then represented in the mind are poorly understood. We present a formal analysis of symbolic learning-in particular, word learning-in terms of prediction and cue competition, and we consider two possible ways in which symbols might be learned: by learning to predict a label from the features of objects and events in the world, and by learning to predict features from a label. This analysis predicts significant differences in symbolic learning depending on the sequencing of objects and labels. We report a computational simulation and two human experiments that confirm these differences, revealing the existence of Feature-Label-Ordering effects in learning. Discrimination learning is facilitated when objects predict labels, but not when labels predict objects. Our results and analysis suggest that the semantic categories people use to understand and communicate about the world can only be learned if labels are predicted from objects. We discuss the implications of this for our understanding of the nature of language and symbolic thought, and in particular, for theories of reference.Keywords: Language; Learning; Representation; Concepts; Computational modeling; Prediction Symbolic thought and symbolic communication are defining human characteristics. Yet despite the benefits symbols bring in allowing us to organize, communicate about, manipulate, and master the world, our understanding of symbols and symbolic knowledge is poor. Centuries of pondering the nature of symbolic representation, in terms of concepts and categories and words and their meanings, has yielded more puzzles than answers (Murphy, 2002; Wittgenstein, 1953). Our impoverished understanding of symbolic learning, and especially how words and their meanings are learned, represented, and used, contrasts starkly with the progress made in other areas, where computational models of learning processes Correspondence should be sent to Michael Ramscar,

As adults age, their performance on many psychometric tests changes systematically, a finding that is widely taken to reveal that cognitive information-processing capacities decline across adulthood. Contrary to this, we suggest that older adults' changing performance reflects memory search demands, which escalate as experience grows. A series of simulations show how the performance patterns observed across adulthood emerge naturally in learning models as they acquire knowledge. The simulations correctly identify greater variation in the cognitive performance of older adults, and successfully predict that older adults will show greater sensitivity to fine-grained differences in the properties of test stimuli than younger adults. Our results indicate that older adults' performance on cognitive tests reflects the predictable consequences of learning on informationprocessing, and not cognitive decline. We consider the implications of this for our scientific and cultural understanding of aging.

As children learn their mother tongues, they make systematic errors. For example, English-speaking children regularly say mouses rather than mice . Because children’s errors are not explicitly corrected, it has been argued that children could never learn to make the transition to adult language based on the evidence available to them, and thus that learning even simple aspects of grammar is logically impossible without recourse to innate, language-specific constraints. Here, we examine the role children’s expectations play in language learning and present a model of plural noun learning that generates a surprising prediction: at a given point in learning, exposure to regular plurals (e.g. rats ) can decrease children’s tendency to overregularize irregular plurals (e.g. mouses ). Intriguingly, the model predicts that the same exposure should have the opposite effect earlier in learning. Consistent with this, we show that testing memory for items with regular plural labels contributes to a decrease in irregular plural overregularization in six-year-olds, but to an increase in four-year-olds. Our model and results suggest that children’s overregularization errors both arise and resolve themselves as a consequence of the distribution of error in the linguistic environment, and that far from presenting a logical puzzle for learning, they are inevitable consequences of it.

Why do adult language learners typically fail to acquire second languages with native proficiency? Does prior linguistic experience influence the size of the "units" adults attend to in learning, and if so, how does this influence what gets learned? Here, we examine these questions in relation to grammatical gender, which adult learners almost invariably struggle to master. We present a model of learning that predicts that exposure to smaller units (such as nouns) before exposure to larger linguistic units (such as sentences) can critically impair learning about predictive relations between units: such as that between a noun and its article. This prediction is then confirmed by a study of adult participants learning grammatical gender in an artificial language. Adults learned both nouns and their articles better when they were first heard nouns used in context with their articles prior to hearing the nouns individually, compared with learners who first heard the nouns in isolation, prior to hearing them used in context. In the light of these results, we discuss the role gender appears to play in language, the importance of meaning in artificial grammar learning, and the implications of this work for the structure of L2-training.

In this study we present a novel set of discrimination-based indicators of language processing derived from Naive Discriminative Learning (ndl) theory. We compare the effectiveness of these new measures with classical lexical-distributional measures—in particular, frequency counts and form similarity measures—to predict lexical decision latencies when a complete morphological segmentation of masked primes is or is not possible. Data derive from a re-analysis of a large subset of decision latencies from the English Lexicon Project, as well as from the results of two new masked priming studies. Results demonstrate the superiority of discrimination-based predictors over lexical-distributional predictors alone, across both the simple and primed lexical decision tasks. Comparable priming after masked corner and cornea type primes, across two experiments, fails to support early obligatory segmentation into morphemes as predicted by the morpho-orthographic account of reading. Results fit well with ndl theory, which, in conformity with Word and Paradigm theory, rejects the morpheme as a relevant unit of analysis. Furthermore, results indicate that readers with greater spelling proficiency and larger vocabularies make better use of orthographic priors and handle lexical competition more efficiently.

In a series of studies children show increasing mastery of irregular plural forms (such as mice) simply by producing erroneous over-regularized versions of them (such as mouses). We explain this phenomenon in terms of successive approximation in imitation: Children over-regularize early in acquisition because the representations of frequent, regular plural forms develop more quickly, such that at the earliest stages of production they interfere with children's attempts to imitatively reproduce irregular forms they have heard in the input. As the strength of the representations that determine children's productions settle asymptotically, the early advantage for the frequent regular forms is negated, and children's attempts to imitate the irregular forms they have observed become more likely to succeed (a process that produces the classic U-shape in children's acquisition of plural inflection). These data show that children can acquire correct linguistic behavior without feedback in a situation where, as a result of philosophical and linguistic analyses, it has often been argued that it is logically impossible for them to do so.

The field of cognitive aging has seen considerable advances in describing the linguistic and semantic changes that happen during the adult life span to uncover the structure of the mental lexicon (i.e., the mental repository of lexical and conceptual representations). Nevertheless, there is still debate concerning the sources of these changes, including the role of environmental exposure and several cognitive mechanisms associated with learning, representation, and retrieval of information. We review the current status of research in this field and outline a framework that promises to assess the contribution of both ecological and psychological aspects to the aging lexicon. Cognitive Aging and the Mental Lexicon There is consensus in the cognitive sciences that human development extends well beyond childhood and adolescence, and there has been remarkable empirical progress in the field of cognitive aging in past decades [1]. Nevertheless, the role of environmental and cognitive factors in age-related changes in the structure and processing of lexical and semantic representations (see Glossary) is still under debate. For example, age-related memory decline is commonly attributed to a decline in cognitive abilities [2,3], yet some researchers have proposed that massive exposure to language over the course of one's life leads to knowledge gains that may contribute to, if not fully account for, age-related memory deficits [4-6]. We argue that to resolve such debates we require an interdisciplinary approach that captures how information exposure across adulthood may change the way that we acquire, represent, and recall information. We summarize recent developments in the field (Figure 1, Table 1) and propose a conceptual framework (Figure 2, Key Figure) and associated research agenda that argues for combining ecological analyses, formal modeling, and large-scale empirical studies to shed light on the contents, structure, and neural basis of the aging mental lexicon in both health and disease. Mental Lexicon: Aging and Cognitive Performance The mental lexicon can be thought of as a repository of lexical and conceptual representations, composed of organized networks of semantic, phonological, orthographic, morphological, and other types of information [7]. The cognitive sciences have provided considerable knowledge about the computational (Box 1; [8-11]) and neural basis (Box 2; [12,13]) of lexical and semantic cognition, and there has been considerable interest in how such aspects of cognition change across adulthood and aging [14,15]. Past work on the aging lexicon emphasized the amount of information acquired across the life span (e.g., vocabulary gains across adulthood; [15]); however, new evaluations using graphbased approaches suggest that both quantity and structural aspects of representations differ between individuals [16] and change across the life span [17-19]. Such insights were gathered, for example, from a large-scale analysis of free association data from thousands of individuals [17], ranging from 10 to ...