Brain dead organ donors are the principal source of transplantable organs. However, it is controversial whether brain death is the same as biological death. Therefore, it is unclear whether organ removal in brain death is consistent with the ‘dead donor rule’, which states that organ removal must not cause death. Our aim was to evaluate the public's opinion about organ removal if explicitly described as causing the death of a donor in irreversible apneic coma. We conducted a cross-sectional internet survey of the American public (n=1096). Questionnaire domains included opinions about a hypothetical scenario of organ removal described as causing the death of a patient in irreversible coma, and items measuring willingness to donate organs after death. Some 71% of the sample agreed that it should be legal for patients to donate organs in the scenario described and 67% agreed that they would want to donate organs in a similar situation. Of the 85% of the sample who agreed that they were willing to donate organs after death, 76% agreed that they would donate in the scenario of irreversible coma with organ removal causing death. There appears to be public support for organ donation in a scenario explicitly described as violating the dead donor rule. Further, most but not all people who would agree to donate when organ removal is described as occurring after death would also agree to donate when organ removal is described as causing death in irreversible coma.
The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) states that an individual is dead when "all functions of the entire brain" have ceased irreversibly. However, it has been questioned whether some functions of the hypothalamus, particularly osmoregulation, can continue after the clinical diagnosis of brain death (BD). In order to learn whether parts of the hypothalamus can continue to function after the diagnosis of BD, we performed 2 separate systematic searches of the MEDLINE database, corresponding to the functions of the posterior and anterior pituitary. No meta-analysis is possible due to nonuniformity in the clinical literature. However, some modest generalizations can reasonably be drawn from a narrative review and from anatomic considerations that explain why these findings should be expected. We found evidence suggesting the preservation of hypothalamic function, including secretion of hypophysiotropic hormones, responsiveness to anterior pituitary stimulation, and osmoregulation, in a substantial proportion of patients declared dead by neurological criteria. We discuss several possible explanations for these findings. We conclude by suggesting that additional clinical research with strict inclusion criteria is necessary and further that a more nuanced and forthright public dialogue is needed, particularly since standard diagnostic practices and the UDDA may not be entirely in accord.
The established view regarding ‘brain death’ in medicine and medical ethics is that patients determined to be dead by neurological criteria are dead in terms of a biological conception of death, not a philosophical conception of personhood, a social construction or a legal fiction. Although such individuals show apparent signs of being alive, in reality they are (biologically) dead, though this reality is masked by the intervention of medical technology. In this article, we argue that an appeal to the distinction between appearance and reality fails in defending the view that the ‘brain dead’ are dead. Specifically, this view relies on an inaccurate and overly simplistic account of the role of medical technology in the physiology of a ‘brain dead’ patient. We conclude by offering an explanation of why the conventional view on ‘brain death’, though mistaken, continues to be endorsed in light of its connection to organ transplantation and the dead donor rule.
The effort to develop international guidelines for determination of death purports to start with an objective examination of the biology of death. So far, however, it is showing once again how moral and metaphysical claims about death masquerade as scientific facts.
Death determined by neurological criteria, or brain death, is an accepted legal standard for death throughout much of the world. However, brain death has also been a source of controversy ever since its inception, and recently it has been subjected to increased scrutiny, both in academia and in the public domain. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the literature on brain death, with a focus on clinical and ethical perspectives on the topic. To provide context, the history and legal standards, pathophysiology, and clinical diagnostic standards for brain death are reviewed in this paper. Controversies regarding the diagnostic tests and pathophysiology of brain death, the validity of neurological criteria for death, the relationship between brain death and organ transplantation, and several recent legal cases involving brain death in the USA are also reviewed.
The controversy surrounding the dead donor rule and the adequacy of neurological criteria for death continues unabated. However, despite disagreement on fundamental theoretical questions, I argue that there is significant (but not complete) agreement on the permissibility of organ retrieval from heart-beating donors. Many disagreements are rooted in disputes surrounding language meaning and use, rather than the practices of transplant medicine. Thus I suggest that the debate can be fruitfully recast in terms of a dispute about language. Given this recasting, I argue that the language used to describe organ donation is misleading and paternalistic. Finally, I suggest that the near-agreement on the permissibility of heart-beating organ retrieval ought to be reconsidered. If the paternalism is not justified, then either the language used to describe organ transplantation must change radically, or it would seem to follow that much of the transplant enterprise lacks ethical justification.
Some patients who have been diagnosed as "dead by neurologic criteria" continue to exhibit certain brain functions, most commonly, neuroendocrine functions. This preservation of neurologic function after the diagnosis of "brain death" or "brainstem death" is an ongoing source of controversy and concern in the medical, bioethics, and legal literatures. Most obviously, if some brain function persists, then it is not the case that all functions of the entire brain have ceased and hence, declaring such a patient to be "dead" would be a false positive, in any nation with so-called "whole brain death" laws. Furthermore, and perhaps more concerning, the preservation of any brain function necessarily entails the preservation of some amount of brain perfusion, thereby raising the concern as to whether additional areas of neural tissue may remain viable, including areas in the brainstem. These and other considerations cast significant doubt on the reliability of diagnosing either "brain death" or "brainstem death."
The majority of transplantable human organs are retrieved from patients declared dead by neurological criteria, or "brain-dead." Since brain death is considered to be sufficient for death, the procurement of vital organs is not considered to harm or wrong such patients. In this essay I argue that this is not the case. After distinguishing welfare, experiential, and investment interests, and defining precedent autonomy and surviving interests, I argue that brain-dead patients can be, and many are, harmed and wronged by organ procurement as currently practiced. Indeed, with respect to precedent autonomy and surviving investment interests, the brain-dead are morally equivalent to patients with severe dementia, and thus can be harmed and wronged if and only if, and to the extent that, patients with severe dementia can. The "bright line" that separates brain death from all other conditions for clinical and legal purposes is not justified by any morally relevant distinctions.
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