A reiteration of the concluding section of ‘The paradigm that lost its way’ (International Affairs, October 2001) explains that the attitudes which shape Western behaviour and its approach to international relations are a product of the circumstances that prevailed from 1945 to 1953, which became entrenched by the Cold War. The article argues that this ‘adversarial national security paradigm’ is increasingly dysfunctional; it is ill‐suited to the global problems that lie ahead and the West should shift to a ‘cooperative global security paradigm’. The reflexive aspects of international relations are highlighted and the utility of attitudinal paradigms is discussed, before turning to consider how a paradigm shift might be engineered. Drawing on recent examples, the prerequisites are shown to be: an impulse for change (common fears, a shared vision); the removal of obstacles to change (usually the most difficult); an engine of change; and a precipitating event or agency. The rest of the article discusses how these prerequisites could be met and shows how Britain could act as precipitator. A postscript considers the relevance of 11 September 2001 to these ideas.
For those who call for a change in our approach to international relations ecause they doubt the capacity of the existing system to handle the problems hat lie ahead, the ‘paradigm’ they are seeking to ‘shift’ is usually some image of realism, that dates from Westphalia and beyond. Fortunately, the paradigm that actually shaped Western foreign policy behaviour in the last 50 years or so was a product of circumstances and personalities in the 1945–53 period that generated attitudes and behaviour patterns that became entrenched during the Cold War. In relation to the complex problems that face the international community, this national security paradigm is increasingly dysfunctional. However, because it comprises ‘attitudes’ rather than rules for action, and is non‐deterministic, we should find it easier to devise an alternative, more functional paradigm and to engineer the necessary shift. The historical review that comprises the bulk of this article describes the genesis of the paradigm and how the patterns of behaviour and underlying beliefs and attitudes became entrenched in Western foreign policy. Fleshing out the characteristics of the existing paradigm suggests an alternative approach to international relations, but the importance and feasibility of engineering the necessary shift will be argued in a subsequent article in the January 2002 issue of International Affairs
In principle, the question was answered by our political leaders in the days following the start of NATO's air campaign against Serbia. In practice, the answers raised new questions as to why these intelligent men were saying such things.Using similar words in various formulations, George Robertson and Robin Cook explained (repeatedly) that the political objective was to avert a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo and/or to prevent a crisis from becoming a catastrophe. This was to be achieved by strategic and precision bombing of military targets (initially in Serbia) in order to reduce the capability of Serb forces to: continue with their violence; repress the Kosovar Albanians; order ethnic cleansing. There was an obvious disjunction between the stated military objective of degrading Serbia's military capability (a slow process) and the immediate political objective of halting the forced expulsions and associated killings in Kosovo. Indeed, bombing Belgrade seemed likely to inflame the situation, and made sense only if one believed that this demonstration of NATO resolve would cause Slobodan Milosevic to halt the process himself. That did not happen. We were then told-despite events in Bosnia and Croatia-that no one could have foreseen that Milosevic could have been so wicked. The continued bombing was justified by describing what was happening in Kosovo (which was terrible enough) using exaggerated and emotive language, including talk of genocide which, in common parlance, clearly did not apply. Meanwhile, our leaders continued to demonize Milosevic.In the past, demonizing has been used to justify offensive military action that in other circumstances might be questionable. Abdul Nasser (whom Britain likened to Hitler) at the time of the Suez crisis is one such example; Muammar Qadhafi as ruler of Libya is another.So what exactly was afoot? Was this a punishment beating in the Balkans, where NATO, dissatisfied over UN ineffectiveness, was taking the law into its own hands? Or was there something more to the whole affair?This article is divided into two parts. The first is descriptive, reviewing the situation through to the end of 1998 and then summarizing events during the first six months of 1999. The second part revisits the evidence, following up
European security depends on the effective collaboration of the five major powers; it will be undermined by the extension of NATO, a policy driven by US domestic politics. The main threats to security are: the breakdown of political and economic stability; unintended nuclear proliferation and/or failure of the START process; Russia's evolving political and territorial aspirations. All three will remain marginal as long as Russia is constructively engaged with the West. NATO expansion threatens that engagement. It is seen by all strands of Russian opinion as violating the bargain struck in 1990 and will likely lead to the withdrawal of cooperation. Invitations to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic cannot be rescinded, but the consequences can be mitigated by refraining from integrating them into NATO's military structure, by ceasing to insist that NATO membership is open to all, and by perpetuating the de facto nuclear-weapons-free zone that presently exists in Central and Eastern Europe. Britain's stance could be pivotal.
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