International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors currently perform periodic inspections at uranium enrichment plants to verify UF 6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are typically performed with handheld high-resolution instruments on a statistically determined sampling of cylinders taken to be representative of the facility's entire product-cylinder inventory. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing a concept to automate the verification of enrichment plant cylinders to enable 100 percent product-cylinder verification and potentially, mass-balance calculations on the facility as a whole (by also measuring feed and tails cylinders). The Integrated Cylinder Verification System (ICVS) could be located at key measurement points to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the collected data in a secure database (mailbox), and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until IAEA inspector arrival. PNNL's ICVS concept uses measurement systems that can be operated in an unattended mode: medium-resolution scintillators for gamma-ray spectroscopy and moderated He-3 neutron detectors. Prior proof-of-principle studies of advanced nondestructive assay (NDA) methods for automated enrichment assay, particularly neutron-related signatures spawned by U-234 alpha emission, have encouraged further development of NDA methods suitable for an ICVS prototype. The work described in this report was supported by NA-243 funding in late FY09, following completion of the initial PNNL Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD)-funded study that focused on non-traditional NDA signatures. A proposal has been submitted to NA-241 for design and testing of a prototype ICVS that utilizes both non-traditional and traditional NDA signatures. Work on the components of the ICVS that do not involve research and development will continue to be supported under NA-243, and are addressed in separate reports. The three main objectives of this FY09 project are summarized here and described in more detail in the report: 1) Develop a preliminary design for a prototype NDA system, 2) Refine PNNL's MCNP models of the NDA system, and 3) Procure and test key pulse-processing components. Progress against these tasks to date, and next steps, are discussed. v
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This report provides background information and representative scenarios for testing a prototype radiation-triggered surveillance system at an operating facility that handles uranium hexafluoride (UF 6) cylinders. The safeguards objective is to trigger cameras using radiation, or radiation and motion, rather than motion alone, to reduce significantly the number of image files generated by a motion-triggered system. The authors recommend the use of radiation-triggered surveillance at all facilities where cylinder paths are heavily traversed by personnel. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has begun using surveillance cameras in the feed and withdrawal areas of gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). 1 The cameras generate imagery using elapsed time or motion, but this creates problems in areas occupied 24/7 by personnel. Either motion-or-interval-based triggering generates thousands of review files over the course of a month. Since inspectors must review the files to verify operator material-flow-declarations, a plethora of files significantly extends the review process. Undeclared production, an instance where operators use undeclared, natural UF 6 to produce undeclared product in the form of low-enriched UF 6 , remains a safeguards quandary. This is primarily because process cylinders are under neither seal nor surveillance at most facilities. The IAEA's New Model Safeguards Approach recommends the sealing of all empty and full cylinders or the use of surveillance in the process area as a means of detecting unreported production. 2 Placing all cylinders and process stations under seal at a commercial facility is very time consuming and would require a continual inspector presence so as not to interfere with operations. There is no easy means of sealing all cylinders at their stations, but the authors believe inspectors can apply surveillance in areas of high activity if the cameras use radiation rather than motion for triggering.
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