Banks, debt, securitization, regulatory capital,

We model competing risks of mortgage termination where the borrower faces a repeated choice to continue to pay, refinance the loan, move or default. Most previous empirical work on mortgage prepayment has ignored the distinction between prepayments triggered by refinancing and moving, combining them into a single prepayment rate. We show that financial considerations are the primary drivers of the refinance choice while homeowner characteristics have more influence on the move decision. We demonstrate that these differences are statistically significant and that combining these two distinct choices into a single measure of prepayment shifts coefficients toward zero and produces inaccurate predictions of aggregate termination rates. For example, a combined model underestimates the effect of the market price of the loan on refinancing; it misses entirely the opposite effects of borrower income on moving and refinancing. Our results suggest that existing prepayment models are inconsistent predictors of mobility-driven prepayment and underestimate the effect of market conditions and borrower characteristics on refinancing and housing decisions. Our findings have great significance to mortgage investors because mobility-driven prepayments are likely to be a more significant source of prepayments in the next decade.Predicting aggregate prepayment is an important issue in mortgage valuation (Hayre, Chaudhary and Young 2000). It is well established (Patruno 1994) that two distinct borrower motivations drive full prepayments of mortgages: (1) the desire to sell the current house and relocate 1 (the "movers") and (2) the desire to 1 Our discussion in this paper focuses on fixed-rate, 15-and 30-year, conventional residential mortgage loans. Almost all conventional loans are originated with "dueon-sale" clauses that require the borrower to prepay the loan when there is a sale of the property. Government insured or guaranteed loans (FHA and VA loans) are fully assumable. For any assumable loan, a move need not generate a loan payoff.

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We develop estimates of risk-based capital requirements for single-family mortgage loans held in portfolio by financial intermediaries. Our method relies on simulation of default and loss probability distributions via simulation of changes in economic variables with conditional default probabilities calibrated to recent actual mortgage loan performance data from the 1990s. Based on simulations with varying input parameters, we find that appropriate capital charges for credit risk vary substantially with loan or borrower characteristics and are generally below the current regulatory standard. These factors may help explain the high degree of securitization, or regulatory capital arbitrage, observed in this asset category.

The cause of the ''housing bubble" associated with the sharp rise and then drop in home prices over the period 1998-2008 has been the focus of significant policy and research attention. The dramatic increase in subprime lending during this period has been broadly blamed for these market dynamics. In this paper we empirically investigate the validity of this hypothesis vs. several other alternative explanations. A model of house price dynamics over the period 1998-2006 is specified and estimated using a cross-sectional time-series data base across 20 metropolitan areas over the period 1998-2006. Results suggest that prior to early 2004, economic fundamentals provide the primary explanation for house price dynamics. Subprime credit activity does not seem to have had much impact on subsequent house price returns at any time during the observation period, although there is strong evidence of a price-boosting effect by investor loans. However, we do find strong evidence that a credit regime shift took place in late 2003, as the GSE's were displaced in the market by private issuers of new mortgage products. Market fundamentals became insignificant in affecting house price returns, and the price-momentum conditions characteristic of a ''bubble" were created. Thus, rather than causing the run-up in house prices, the subprime market may well have been a joint product, along with house price increases, (i.e., the ''tail") of the changing institutional, political, and regulatory environment characteristic of the period after late 2003 (the ''dog").

JEL Classification: G21 G28 H81 R1 Keywords: Mortgage House prices Subprime Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Housing bubble a b s t r a c tThe cause of the ''housing bubble" associated with the sharp rise and then drop in home prices over the period 1998-2008 has been the focus of significant policy and research attention. The dramatic increase in subprime lending during this period has been broadly blamed for these market dynamics. In this paper we empirically investigate the validity of this hypothesis vs. several other alternative explanations. A model of house price dynamics over the period 1998-2006 is specified and estimated using a cross-sectional time-series data base across 20 metropolitan areas over the period 1998-2006. Results suggest that prior to early 2004, economic fundamentals provide the primary explanation for house price dynamics. Subprime credit activity does not seem to have had much impact on subsequent house price returns at any time during the observation period, although there is strong evidence of a price-boosting effect by investor loans. However, we do find strong evidence that a credit regime shift took place in late 2003, as the GSE's were displaced in the market by private issuers of new mortgage products. Market fundamentals became insignificant in affecting house price returns, and the price-momentum conditions characteristic of a ''bubble" were created. Thus, rather than causing the run-up in house prices, the subprime market may well have been a joint product, along with house price increases, (i.e., the ''tail") of the changing institutional, political, and regulatory environment characteristic of the period after late 2003 (the ''dog").

This paper uses microlevel data to examine recent prepayment performance of adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) employing the competing risk methodology developed by Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000). We find support for the teaser rate and adjustment date effects implied by the theoretical model of Kau "et al." (1993). In addition, we find that teased ARMs bear prepayment risk related to their discount, contrary to results reported by VanderHoff (1996) and Green and Shilling (1997). Finally, and contrary to the usual finding for fixed-rate mortgages, we find that loan age has a negative effect on prepayment risk for ARMs, consistent with the phenomenon that borrowers with high mobility and/or propensity to refinance exit the pool early. Copyright 2001 by the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.

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