Public reporting burder for this collection of information is estibated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burder to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. ABSTRACT The Army as well as the other armed services began a transformation in the late 1990s in order to meet the challenges of warfare in the future. This effort is characterized by utilizing technology as the catalyst for change. The process has proceeded with fits and starts since that time and virtually nobody is certain of the outcome. A review of history demonstrates that there is a viable alternative to a technological methodology for transformation that could stimulate change across the services. The stimulant mentioned is in the form of a new theory of war. A new American theory of war could provide a different approach for navigating through the uncertainty of transformation. Theory as a logical starting point can establish the intellectual foundation for doctrine and organizations, developing new technology to support the doctrine, and the training paradigm to mature the concepts. Further, theory can drive development over a very long period of time as demonstrated by the evolution of airpower during the 20th century. By contrast, technology as a catalyst does not always provide a clear path to service reform. In the 1980s the Army formed a high technology test bed division in an attempt to utilize technology to stimulate long-term change in the force. The test bed experiment is remarkably similar to the current effort to transform. The effort largely failed due to a lack of intellectual underpinning grounded in a theory of war. This monograph examines case studies in airpower theory and the high technology test bed to demonstrate that theory is a prerequisite for long-term change expressed as transformation. Based on an analysis of the case studies this monograph recommends that in order to move transformation in the right direction over the long-term the United States military must adopt a new theory of war. This approach provides a logical basis for development of doctrine, organizations, and technology while ensuring that transformation has the proper intellectual foundation to weather the challenge of war in the 21st century rather than wither as the high technology test bed did in the 1980s. The ...

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

T he 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (3rd IBCT), 10th Mountain Division, was activated on 16 September 2004 at Fort Drum, New York. The brigade's 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment (4-25 FAR), organized along modular lines, is its organic fires battalion.Soon after activating with the brigade, the fires battalion leaders realized they needed a planning process that could leverage the battalion's modular capabilities and enable them to develop plans and orders rapidly in the current operating environment: the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). The battalion commander agreed to an experiment with a new planning model, the recognitionprimed decision model, to determine if it could provide the fires battalion enough agility to be effective in GWOT.Since 4-25 FAR stood up more than a year ago, we have used this model very successfully to prepare for a future deployment to Afghanistan-including during a rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. We recommend the model as an alternative to the traditional military decision-making process (MDMP) for GWOT.The Army's needs in GWOT require rapid planning to produce agility and flexibility. The MDMP does not produce plans and orders quickly enough for the GWOT environment.This article describes the recognitionprimed decision model and how other battalions can use this model.Recognition-Primed Model and MDMP Research. The recognitionprimed decision model is a new plan-ning methodology for standard orders development that is gaining a foothold in the Army. This model allows units to develop feasible plans and orders in time-constrained environments and enables friendly forces to act faster than the enemy. As described in FM 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production, the MDMP has been the Army's decision-making model for more than two decades. With seven steps and 117 sub-steps, it is an analytical process designed to generate the best solution from a series of options. Theoretically, the MDMP enables a commander to employ tactically sound plans that result in success on the battlefield. 1 However, recent research reveals that the MDMP actually has the opposite outcome in many cases. The MDMP is a staff-driven regimen that inadvertently isolates the commander from developing the plan.

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