Once scholars start to think about knowledge societies, at some point in their analyses they have to leave the realms of purely academic interactions among scientists in their sanitized production of knowledge. Conceptions of lay persons then come to the fore. Unfortunately, this realm of interaction traditionally has been far less subject to scholarly scrutiny. The focus of most studies is usually on knowledge, or to be more precise, scientific knowledge, with an odd confidence that this knowledge will faithfully migrate into a context of application once it has been accomplished. Lay persons are of interest for the social sciences as a public that needs and wants to be introduced to science proper. This is the approach that frames the traditional literature on Public Understanding of Science (PUS). Or, as a gesture in critique of PUS, the life world and thought processes of the lay persons themselves are put into focus. However, both of these views consider 'real' flesh and blood lay persons as the main objectives of their analyses. Let us begin our argument with an undemanding observation: in a knowledge society experts are to provide expertise (i.e. scientifically sound information about the facts), recommendations on feasible solutions, and guidance in a world that is ever more entangled with technologies. This observation implies a gradual shift from a scientific world to a shared world that people live in. Moreover, it entails that the experts have conceptions of the persons they should assist in their coping with the world. Conversely, between experts and lay persons there is a division of labour that is based on an epistemic asymmetry: the experts are supposed to be knowledgeable and the lay persons are ignorant. Our aim is to show how this observation about expertise, which seems so undemanding at first glance, turns out to be a thoroughly

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Why are buildings such disputed objects with regard to time and memory, and what makes them peculiar? With the help of actor-network theory and the theory of functional differentiation, I show how objects in general relate to time and how objects can stabilize memories. I demonstrate the different ways in which networks place objects in time and how they are isolated and multiplied to relate to functional systems. I then argue that buildings cannot be controlled by functional systems because they cannot be isolated. This is so because they are singulars, occupy a stable location and are used by multiple users at the same time. For this reason I call them mutable immobiles. As mutable immobiles, buildings develop very complex relationships to times. They are changed and even converted to other building types, which cuts them off from their networks even though they still occupy the same location.

This article explores the elective affinities between Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and the sociology of critical capacities. It argues that these two research programmes can be understood as symmetrical twins. We show the extent to which the exchange between Bruno Latour and Luc Boltanski has influenced their respective theoretical developments. Three strong encounters between the twin research programmes may be distinguished. The first encounter concerns explanations for social change. The second encounter focuses on the status of objects and their relationship to locations. The third encounter is about the concept of critique. Drawing on their long-term mutual readings, we gain insight into how pleas for symmetrical analysis raised in response to Bourdieu's theory of fields have evolved within both ANT and the sociology of critical capacity. We conclude by relating the development of the respective research programmes to the issue of disciplinary boundaries.