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We examine the impact of a firm’s asymmetric information on its choice of three mechanisms of corporate governance: The intensity of board monitoring, the exposure to market discipline, and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. We find that firms facing greater asymmetric information tend to use less intensive board monitoring but rely more on market discipline and CEO incentive alignment. These results are consistent with the monitoring cost hypothesis. In addition, we find that high information-asymmetry firms that have to substantially increase board monitoring intensity after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act suffer poor stock performance. Our evidence therefore suggests that regulators should use caution when imposing uniform corporate governance requirements on all firms.

Higher education institutions (HEIs), among other social systems, have an irreplaceable role in combating COVID-19. However, we know little about institutional and individual factors that might facilitate university students’ beliefs and behaviors toward preventive behaviors for COVID-19 within the higher education context. Our study applies an extended theory of planned behavior (TPB) model to investigate the structural relationships among the institutional climate, attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control and preventive behaviors of university students and to detect the moderating impacts of perceived risk on the structural model. Data were collected from 3693 university students at 18 universities in Beijing, China through an online survey. Structural equation modeling (SEM) and multigroup analysis were performed to examine the empirical model. The results reveal that (1) the institutional climate has a significant, direct effect on preventive behaviors for COVID-19 among university students, (2) the TPB components, namely attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control, partially mediate the relationship between the institutional climate and preventive behaviors for COVID-19, and (3) perceived risk moderates several paths in the model. Theoretical and practical implications are offered, and recommendations for future research are outlined.

We explore the link between open-market share repurchases (OMRs) and asymmetric information based on financial reporting quality and find thatopaquefirms experience positive abnormal returns of twice the magnitude of those oftransparentfirms. These significant differences remain after controlling for governance, earnings management, and firm characteristics. We document significantly positive long-run postannouncement returns for opaque firms, but not for transparent firms. We find that takeover activity and premiums rise with repurchase activity by opaque firms, which may explain some of the wealth effects. Our results suggest that asymmetric information plays an important role in the wealth effects around OMRs.