Government policy constraints and the green credit support of banks have played an indispensable role in promoting the development of the new energy vehicle (NEV) industry. To study the relationship between the government, the banks, and automobile manufacturers in the post-subsidy era and to promote the development of the NEV industry in China, we constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model for the government, the banks, and automobile manufacturers during the subsidy decline, analyzed the evolutionary process of the system, and used MATLAB to simulate the evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) and the sensitivity of related parameters. The results demonstrate the following: (1) There are five possible evolutionary equilibrium points in the early, middle, and late stages of the NEV industry; (2) with the increase in the phase-out rates and the transaction prices of NEV points, the government is more inclined to low subsidies, the banks are more inclined to implement green credit, and enterprises are more inclined to produce NEVs; (3) there is a threshold for the impact of government incentives on the evolutionary results of the government and the banks, beyond which the evolutionary process of the government and the banks will be unstable; (4) with the increase in financing costs saved by green credit, the government is more inclined to low subsidies and enterprises are more inclined to produce NEVs, while changes in financing costs have less impact on the strategies of banks. According to these findings, the government, the banks, and automobile manufacturers can be relied upon to promote the development of the NEV industry in China.
Under the background of the low-carbon economy, considering that manufacturers produce common products and low-carbon products simultaneously and the two products are substituting, three models are set up, namely, no government subsidy, subsidy based on the research and development (R&D) cost, and subsidy based on the production volume of low-carbon products. The Stackelberg game theory is used to analyze the optimal decision of the supply chain under the three methods of government subsidy, the influence of the correlation coefficient on optimal decision-making is discussed, and the effects of different government subsidy methods on the equilibrium solutions are compared and analyzed. Finally, the results are verified and illustrated by example analysis. The study found that the government subsidy reduces the sales volume of common products but increases the sales volume of low-carbon products, the emission reduction of unit low-carbon products, total emission reductions, and manufacturer’s profit. The unit emission reduction and total emission reductions are the highest when the government subsidies are according to the R&D cost, and the manufacturer’s profit is the highest when the government subsidies are according to the production volume of low-carbon products. Total emission reduction and supply members’ profit have a positive relationship with the subsidy coefficient and the sensitivity of consumers toward price difference and have a negative relationship with the R&D cost coefficient.
With the increase in the number of waste power batteries and the occurrence of related environmental problems, battery recycling is receiving extensive attention. Driven by economic benefits, many companies have begun to deploy the waste battery processing market and government subsidies also play an essential role in battery recycling. Considering the vehicle company outsources processing tasks or invests in research and development (R&D), this paper studies the optimal decision-making problem of the supply chain under government subsidy to the battery manufacturer or the battery manufacturer. The research finds that: (1) For the government, when the vehicle company outsources processing tasks, compared with subsidizing the vehicle company, the total recycling volume when subsidizing the battery manufacturer is higher. When the vehicle company invests in R&D, the total recycling volume under different government subsidy strategies is equal. (2) The vehicle company’s decision is only related to its processing costs; when the unit processing cost is low, the vehicle company’s profit under the strategy of investing in R&D is higher. However, when the unit processing cost is high, the profit of outsourcing processing tasks is higher. (3) With increase in unit subsidy and decrease in unit processing cost, the total recycling volume will increase. These findings can provide decision-making help for the government in formulating subsidy policies and the vehicle company in determining processing strategies in the future.
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