This article discusses the concept of publicity in Kant’s moral philosophy. Insofar as the concepts of ‘public’ and ‘private’ can describe our relations with others, they can be considered to be moral concepts. I argue that we can find in Kant a moral duty not to keep our maxims of action private, or secret. Whereas Korsgaard argues that sometimes in the face of evil it is permissible to sidestep the moral law, I argue that it is rather through publicity that we can deal with evil in the non-ideal world. Moreover, by being open with our maxims, moral progress is possible.
Kant writes, 'to have trained one's children is not enough . . . what really matters is that they learn to think' . By 'thinking' , Kant means thinking for oneself. But how can one learn to think for oneself? I focus on how we can be motivated to think for ourselves and argue that for Kant it is through the feeling of wonder. I make my case by drawing an analogy between Kant's discussion of wonder and his discussion of respect. For Kant, we can learn to feel wonder and be motivated to think for ourselves by being presented with seemingly organised objects that give us the occasion to feel wonder. Moreover, for Kant, sometimes the same object that provides the occasion for wonder is also what produces the feeling of respect, namely the pure activity of reason. In this way, wonder helps us to learn how to be virtuous.
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