We consider an online version of the conflict-free coloring of a set of points on the line, where each newly inserted point must be assigned a color upon insertion, and at all times the coloring has to be conflict-free, in the sense that in every interval I there is a color that appears exactly once in I. We present several deterministic and randomized algorithms for achieving this goal, and analyze their performance, that is, the maximum number of colors that they need to use, as a function of the number n of inserted points. We first show that a natural and simple (deterministic) approach may perform rather poorly, requiring Ω(√ n) colors in the worst case. We then derive several efficient algorithms. The first algorithm is randomized and simple to analyze; it requires an expected number of at most O(log 2 n) colors, and produces a coloring which is valid with high probability. The second algorithm is deterministic, and is a variant of the initial simple algorithm; it uses a maximum of Θ(log 2 n) colors. The third algorithm is a randomized variant of the second algorithm; it requires an expected number of at most O(log n log log n) colors and always produces a valid coloring. We also analyze the performance of the simplest proposed algorithm when the points are inserted in a random order, and present an incomplete analysis that indicates that, with high probability, it uses only O(log n) colors. Finally, we show that in the extension of this problem to two dimensions, where the relevant ranges are disks, n colors may be required in the worst case.
Abstract. In this paper we address the open problem of bounding the price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation for undirected graphs posed in [1]. We consider the case where there is an agent in every vertex. We show that the price of stability is O(log log n). We prove this by defining a particular improving dynamics in a related graph. This proof technique may have other applications and is of independent interest.
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds for k-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most k.
We study interval coloring problems and present new upper and lower bounds for several variants. We are interested in four problems, online coloring of intervals with and without bandwidth and a new problem called lazy online coloring again with and without bandwidth. We consider both general interval graphs and unit interval graphs. Specifically, we establish the difference between the two main problems which are interval coloring with and without bandwidth. We present the first nontrivial lower bound of 3.2609 for the problem with bandwidth. This improves the lower bound of 3 that follows from the tight results for interval coloring without bandwidth presented in [9].
We present an improved online algorithm for coloring interval graphs with bandwidth. This problem has recently been studied by Adamy and Erlebach and a 195-competitive online strategy has been presented. We improve this by presenting a 10-competitive strategy. To achieve this result, we use variants of an optimal online coloring algorithm due to Kierstead and Trotter.
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