Online shoppers value lenient return policies as they are unable to assess whether products match their expectations. We study how consumers’ discount-seeking purchase deferrals affect online retailers’ return policy choices. Lenient returns may induce higher full-price sales by limiting consumer regret, while signaling clearance unavailability risk. Contrasting earlier research that concluded a monopolist must set the refund at the clearance price when strategic consumers were overlooked, we find that an optimal refund bounded by the clearance price can mitigate purchase deferrals only when a monopolist salvages at mild discounts. To explore conditions under which a monopolist permits “full-refund returns,” we consider three scenarios: we permit clearing inventory without a loss; we assume lenient returns stimulate aggregate demand; we consider consumers’ transaction costs. We also derive a unique rational expectations equilibrium for competing retailers, wherein each retailer’s equilibrium refund is nondecreasing in its clearance price. Furthermore, retailers with clearance prices below a threshold should not allow returns, and those who do, higher clearance revenues imply higher full prices, higher quantities, and higher profits. We conclude that a credible clearance partner salvaging at higher prices than those at competing clearance mediums helps retailers gain competitive advantage when selling to strategic consumers.
Gray markets are created by unauthorized retailers selling manufacturer's branded products. Similar to international gray markets, domestic gray markets are a growing phenomenon whose impact on supply chains is not clear. We consider a supply chain with one manufacturer and several authorized retailers who face a newsvendor problem and a domestic gray market. While a gray market provides an opportunity for retailers to clear their excess inventory (inventory‐correction effect), it also can be a threat to their demand (demand‐cannibalization effect). We first characterize the emerging equilibrium by assuming an MSRP environment. Comparing a decentralized and centralized system, we show that a wholesale pricing contract is quite efficient in a gray market environment; we explain the underlying mechanism and note some of the operational decisions that could hurt that efficiency. We show that the gray market price determines the degree of both the negative effects of demand‐cannibalization and the positive effects of inventory correction, which in turn determines the net impact of gray markets on the retailer's stocking choice and, ultimately, the manufacturer's profit. We then study the authorized retailers' problem as a price‐setting newsvendor. We observe that the gray market creates price competition between the authorized and unauthorized retailers, causing a drop in the primary market price. However, this price competition can be counteracted by the authorized retailers' stocking decision. Finally, we extend our model to consider the cases where the demand can be correlated across retailers.
P roduct launch and pricing decisions in the pharmaceutical industry across different countries are complex. Although introducing a newly developed drug to every country is beneficial to patients worldwide, doing so may have adverse implications for drug developers, such as the emergence of parallel imports. We study a pharmaceutical firm that already introduced a pioneering drug in its home country, where the product is protected by patent rules. The firm decides whether to launch in a second country in the same region, where parallel import between these two countries is feasible and profitable for the parallel importer. We characterize the joint pricing and product launch decision. We show the firm chooses one of three strategies: (i) launch and accommodate parallel import, (ii) launch and deter parallel import, and (iii) not launch. We show that firms are more likely not to launch the drug when the drug price is determined through a negotiation between the firm and the government. We discuss how insurance coverage, market size, quality perception of the parallel imported drug, and valuations affect these strategies. We then study the impact of launch and pricing decisions on social welfare and discuss policy implications for the regulators and potential strategies for the firm to mitigate the negative effects of a parallel import threat. We also study the impact of perfect and imperfect competition among parallel import firms on firm's price and launch decisions. Finally, we discuss the practice of distributing rebates as a post-launch strategy to manage parallel imports.
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