The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels:trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.

Based on asset pricing theory, reward/risk ratios vary positively with maturity of Treasury securities. We study the effect of increasing Treasury bonds' maturity on ex post and ex ante returns and risks in developed and emerging countries. As maturity increases, we show that ex post and ex ante returns are negative and they decrease while ex post and ex ante risks increase in developed countries, resulting in a sharp increase in the ex post and ex ante coefficient of variation. This indicates that investors are negatively rewarded for the risk they face for investing in Treasury bonds in developed markets. In emerging markets, as maturity increases, ex post and ex ante returns are positive for medium and long maturities and they increase while ex ante risk decreases with maturity. As maturity increases, the coefficient of variation in emerging and developed markets increases, indicating that reward to investors for facing extra risk decreases as maturity increases; however, investors are much better rewarded in emerging than developed markets.Coefficient of variation, GARCH, yield to maturity,

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The emergence of one or more risks in the financial markets during a specific period causes a financial crisis. Financial crises impact financial stability, which is a key concern for all financial authorities, including central banks. One way to mitigate the risks any economy faces is to understand the origin of risk and how it spreads through the financial system. Liquidity risk goes hand-in-hand with market risk, as they affect each other during a crisis. After the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, banks showed that they need monitoring and efficient liquidity management during both stress and normal conditions; that is, they require better integration of bank liquidity and market risk management. In this study, we present a new methodology to forecast the systematic market risk adjusted for liquidity cost based on the Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR) risk measure and asymmetric conditional copulas. We analyze a sample of international banks based on asset size in the US, EU, and Asia. Our hypothesis confirms that liquidity risk goes hand-in-hand with market risk, as they affect each other during a crisis. The results show dependence in the tails of the banks’ returns and the market returns. These are very high generally, and even higher for the Covid-19 period than for other periods. The effect of both market risk and liquidity risk on banks during a crisis period is less than in non-crisis periods because banks are well informed institutions and can anticipate a financial crisis and mitigate risk, which explains our results.