There are several reasons why adolescence is interesting. It is in this phase that an individual finds herself fully facing the external world: basically equipped with the kind of social cognition that s/he has acquired at home, at school and through the media during childhood, s/he has now to meet a host of other, diverse views of what “reasonable,” “appropriate,” or “expected” courses of thought and emotions are, in the wild with friends and peers, romantic or sexual partners, teachers and employers, and the society at large. Furthermore, she is also expected, both at home and in the external world, to have a wholly new degree of control over such courses. While the idea that the development of social cognition still progresses after infancy (and possibly throughout the life span) is clearly gaining consensus in the field, the literature building on it is still scarce. One of the reasons for this probably is that most tests used to study it focus on its basic component, namely theory of mind, and have been mostly devised for us with children; therefore, they are not suitable to deal with the hugely increasing complexity of social and mental life during adolescence and adulthood. Starting from a review of the literature available, we will argue that the development of social cognition should be viewed as a largely yet-to-be-understood mix of biological and cultural factors. While it is widely agreed upon that the very initial manifestations of social life in the newborn are largely driven by an innate engine with which all humans are equally endowed, it is also evident that each culture, and each individual within it, develops specific adult versions of social cognition.
Although Personal Informatics stresses the importance of "self"-awareness and "self"-knowledge in collecting personal data, a description of the "self", to which all these knowledge endeavors are addressed, is missing in the current debate. In this article we first review how the different theoretical assumptions that currently inform the design of Personal Informatics tools lack to convey a convincing image of the self which ought to be quantified by these technologies. We then move on to the outline of a theory of the self that may ground the current discourse in Personal Informatics. Building on this theoretical framework, we propose a set of design guidelines as its implications, which may drive the design of future self-tracking technologies. Finally, we outline a research agenda, organized around such guidelines, in the form of research questions to be addressed in the future. CONTENTS1. INTRODUCTION 2. THE SELF IN PERSONAL INFORMATICS 2.1 Self and behavior 2.2 A utilitarian view of the self 3. A THEORY OF THE SELF FOR PERSONAL INFORMATICS 3.1 Premise 3.2 The present self 3.3 The past self 3.4 The future self 3.5 The interconnected self 4. CONCLUSION what theoretical issues are the most important to explore and our recommendations of specific research directions to follow. THE SELF IN PERSONAL INFORMATICSPI systems are commonly defined as "those that help people collect personally relevant information for the purpose of self-reflection and gaining self-knowledge" (Li et al., 2010, p. 558). This definition stresses the main promise that these technologies appear to make to their users: to improve life based on a renewed self-understanding.Curiously, however, a description of this "self", to which these knowledge endeavors are addressed, is missing in the current debate within PI. PI systems emphasize the benefits that allegedly derive from "self"-reflection and "self"-knowledge, but what is the "self" they are designed for? At first sight, the answer may appear to be obvious: an individual's self shows from the plethora of personal data gathered by PI tools. Nevertheless, on a closer look, this self turns out to be void, due both to the lack of a theoretical framework capable of capturing its essence and features, and to the attempt to reverse the natural way of looking at the self, namely from a subjective point of view. Self and behaviorFirst, it must be noted that most PI tools merely collect and display behavioral/physiological information like the number of steps taken, or the blood pressure level (Li, Dey, & Forlizzi, 2012). The self that these instruments quantify thus is reduced to the data pattern referred to the single behavior/parameter tracked, and the self-knowledge that they actually provide is mere information about how the user behaved in the past.However, the vanishing of the self within the rhetoric of PI is not only a matter of what these tools display and how, but is rooted in theoretical assumptions that, although not always explicit, deeply affect the PI discourse. In fact, the framewor...
a b s t r a c t A large body of literature agrees that persons with schizophrenia suffer from a Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit. However, most empirical studies have focused on third-person, egocentric ToM, underestimating other facets of this complex cognitive skill. Aim of this research is to examine the ToM of schizophrenic persons considering its various aspects (first-vs. second-order, first-vs. third-person, egocentric vs. allocentric, beliefs vs. desires vs. positive emotions vs. negative emotions and how each of these mental state types may be dealt with), to determine whether some components are more impaired than others. We developed a Theory of Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.) and administered it to 22 persons with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia and a matching control group. Th.o.-m.a.s. is a semi-structured interview which allows a multi-component measurement of ToM. Both groups were also administered a few existing ToM tasks and the schizophrenic subjects were administered the Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale and the WAIS-R. The schizophrenic persons performed worse than control at all the ToM measurements; however, these deficits appeared to be differently distributed among different components of ToM.Our conclusion is that ToM deficits are not unitary in schizophrenia, which also testifies to the importance of a complete and articulated investigation of ToM.
Aim of the paper is to discuss the extent to which pragmatics, i.e., the ability to use language and other expressive means to convey meaning in a specific interactional context, overlaps with Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e., the ability to ascribe mental states to oneself and the others. We present empirical data available in the current literature concerning the relation between these two faculties, with specific reference to the developmental and clinical domains. Part of the literature we take into account appears to show that ToM does correlate with pragmatic ability; however, other studies appear to show that pragmatic ability alone cannot explain the empirical differences of performance across different kinds of pragmatic tasks, and therefore that another, at least partially different faculty is required to account for human communication. We argue that to conceive pragmatics as a sort of subcomponent of ToM, and thus to conflate or reduce the notion of pragmatics into the (wider) notion of ToM, is not theoretically correct and a possible cause of methodological confusion in the relevant empirical research. It thus turns out to be necessary that the two faculties be investigated with separate theories as well as different experimental tasks.
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