Dechow and Dichev (2002) model earnings quality as the magnitude of estimation errors in accruals, and provide empirical estimates of this construct based on the relation between accruals and cash flows. I characterize the innovation and limitations in this approach, and provide empirical evidence of measurement error in their empirical specification. I also adapt their model to assess the specification of the Jones' (1991) model and document that this model provides estimates of discretionary accruals that are significantly associated with cash flows, which are likely to be substantially nondiscretionary. I conclude with suggestions for future research on earnings quality and earnings management.

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This paper examines whether firms manipulating their reported financial results make suboptimal investment decisions. We examine fixed asset investments for a large sample of public companies during the 1978–2002 period and document that firms that manipulate their earnings—firms investigated by the SEC for accounting irregularities, firms sued by their shareholders for improper accounting, and firms that restated financial statements—over-invest substantially during the misreporting period. Furthermore, following the misreporting period, these firms no longer over-invest, consistent with corrected information leading to more efficient investment levels. We find similar patterns for firms with high discretionary revenues or accruals. Our findings suggest that earnings management, which is largely viewed as targeting parties external to the firm, can also influence internal decisions.

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