Email and chat still constitute the majority of electronic communication on the Internet. The standardisation and acceptance of protocols such as SMTP, IMAP, POP3, XMPP, and IRC has allowed to deploy servers for email and chat in a decentralised and interoperable fashion. These protocols can be secured by providing encryption with TLS-directly or via the STARTTLS extension. X.509 PKIs and ad hoc methods can be leveraged to authenticate communication peers. However, secure configuration is not straight-forward and many combinations of encryption and authentication mechanisms lead to insecure deployments and potentially compromise of data in transit. In this paper, we present the largest study to date that investigates the security of our email and chat infrastructures. We used active Internet-wide scans to determine the amount of secure service deployments, and employed passive monitoring to investigate to which degree user agents actually choose secure mechanisms for their communication. We addressed both client-to-server interactions as well as server-to-server forwarding. Apart from the authentication and encryption mechanisms that the investigated protocols offer on the transport layer, we also investigated the methods for client authentication in use on the application layer. Our findings shed light on an insofar unexplored area of the Internet. Our results, in a nutshell, are a mix of both positive and negative findings. While large providers offer good security for their users, most of our communication is poorly secured in transit, with weaknesses in the cryptographic setup and especially in the choice of authentication mechanisms. We present a list of actionable changes to improve the situation.
Abstract. A central problem on the Internet today is that key infrastructure for security is concentrated in a few places. This is particularly true in the areas of naming and public key infrastructure. Secret services and other government organizations can use this fact to block access to information or monitor communications. One of the most popular and easy to perform techniques is to make information on the Web inaccessible by censoring or manipulating the Domain Name System (DNS). With the introduction of DNSSEC, the DNS is furthermore posed to become an alternative PKI to the failing X.509 CA system, further cementing the power of those in charge of operating DNS. This paper maps the design space and gives design requirements for censorship resistant name systems. We survey the existing range of ideas for the realization of such a system and discuss the challenges these systems have to overcome in practice. Finally, we present the results from a survey on browser usage, which supports the idea that delegation should be a key ingredient in any censorship resistant name system.
Abstract. Analyzing network environments for security flaws and assessing new service and infrastructure configurations in general are dangerous and error-prone when done in operational networks. Therefore, cloning such networks into a dedicated test environment is beneficial for comprehensive testing and analysis without impacting the operational network. To automate this reproduction of a network environment in a physical or virtualized testbed, several key features are required: (a) a suitable network model to describe network environments, (b) an automated acquisition process to instantiate this model for the respective network environment, and (c) an automated setup process to deploy the instance to the testbed.With this work, we present INSALATA, an automated and extensible framework to reproduce physical or virtualized network environments in network testbeds. INSALATA employs a modular approach for data acquisition and deployment, resolves interdependencies in the setup process, and supports just-in-time reproduction of network environments. INSALATA is open source and available on Github. To highlight its applicability, we present a real world case study utilizing INSALATA.
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