In the past five years, teacher evaluation has become a preferred policy lever at the federal, state, and local levels. Revisions to teacher evaluation systems have made teachers individually accountable for student achievement to a greater extent than ever before. We describe and analyze the components, processes, and consequences embedded in new teacher evaluation policies in all fifty states, the twenty-five largest school districts, and Washington, DC. We contextualize these policies by basing our analysis in prior research on teacher evaluation, and examining key comparisons between state and district policies, including their treatment of teachers in tested and untested subjects with career and beginning teachers. We find notable differences in how states and the largest districts have structured evaluation policies for all teachers and, in particular, for early career teachers compared with their more veteran counterparts, and for teachers in nontested grades and subjects compared with those in tested grades and subjects.

Chicago Public Schools initiated the Excellence in Teaching Project, a teacher evaluation program designed to increase student learning by improving classroom instruction through structured principal–teacher dialogue. The pilot began in forty-four elementary schools in 2008–09 (cohort 1) and scaled up to include an additional forty-eight elementary schools in 2009–10 (cohort 2). Leveraging the experimental design of the rollout, cohort 1 schools performed better in reading and math than cohort 2 schools at the end of the first year, though the math effects are not statistically significant. We find the initial improvement for cohort 1 schools remains even after cohort 2 schools adopted the program. Moreover, the pilot differentially impacted schools with different characteristics. Higher-achieving and lower-poverty schools were the primary beneficiaries, suggesting the intervention was most successful in more advantaged schools. These findings are relevant for policy makers and school leaders who are implementing evaluation systems that incorporate classroom observations.

Discipline reformers claim that suspensions negatively affect suspended students, while others suggest reforms have unintended consequences for peers. Using student panel data from the School District of Philadelphia, we implement student fixed effects and instrumental variable (IV) strategies to examine the consequences of suspensions for offending students and their peers. A suspension decreases math and reading achievement for suspended students. The effects are robust to IV estimates leveraging a district-wide policy change in suspension use. Suspensions are more salient for students who personally experience suspension than for their peers. Exposure to suspensions for more serious misconduct has very small, negative spillovers onto peer achievement, but does not change peer absences.

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