Despite the active neural mechanisms that support the temporary maintenance of stimulus-specific information, visual working memory (VWM) content can be systematically biased towards novel perceptual input. These memory biases are commonly attributed to interference that arises when perceptual input is physically similar to current VWM content. However, recent work has suggested that deliberately comparing the similarity of VWM representations to novel perceptual input modulates the size of memory biases above and beyond stimulus-driven effects. Here, we sought to determine the modulatory nature of deliberate perceptual comparisons by comparing the size of memory biases following deliberate comparisons to those induced instead when novel perceptual input is ignored (Experiment 1) or encoded into VWM (Experiment 2). We find that individuals reported larger attraction biases in their VWM representation following deliberate perceptual comparisons than when they ignored or remembered the perceptual input. An analysis of participants’ perceptual comparisons revealed that memory biases were amplified when the perceptual input was endorsed as similar—but not dissimilar—to the current VWM representation. This pattern persisted even after the physical similarity between the VWM representation and perceptual input was matched across trials, confirming that perceptual comparisons themselves played a causal role in modulating memory biases. Together, these findings are consistent with the view that using a VWM representation to evaluate novel perceptual input risks exaggerating the featural overlap between them.
Despite the massive capacity of visual long-term memory, individuals do not successfully encode all visual information they wish to remember. This variability in encoding success has been traditionally ascribed to fluctuations in individuals’ cognitive states (e.g., sustained attention) and differences in memory encoding processes (e.g., depth of encoding). However, recent work has shown that a considerable amount of variability in encoding success stems from intrinsic stimulus properties that determine the ease of encoding across individuals. While researchers have identified several perceptual and semantic properties that contribute to this stimulus memorability phenomenon, much remains unknown, including whether individuals are aware of the memorability of stimuli they encounter. In the present study, we investigated whether individuals have conscious access to the memorability of real-world stimuli while forming self-referential judgments of learning (JOL) during explicit memory encoding (Experiments 1A-B) and when asked about the perceived memorability of a stimulus in the absence of attempted encoding (Experiments 2A-B). We found that both JOLs and perceived memorability estimates were consistent across individuals and reliably predicted stimulus memorability. However, this apparent access to the properties that define memorability was not comprehensive. Individuals unexpectedly remembered and forgot consistent sets of stimuli as well. Thus, our findings demonstrate that individuals have conscious access to some—but not all—aspects of stimulus memorability and that this access exists regardless of the present demands on stimulus encoding.
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