Research into post-independence identity shifts among Kazakhstan's Russian-speaking minorities has outlined a number of possible pathways, such as diasporization, integrated national minority status and ethnic separatism. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with young people in Almaty and Karaganda, I examine how Russian-speaking minorities identify with the state and imagine their place in a 'soft' or 'hybrid' post-Soviet authoritarian system. What is found is that Russian-speaking minorities largely accept their status beneath the Kazakh 'elder brother' and do not wish to identify as a 'national minority'. Furthermore, they affirm passive loyalty to the political status quo while remaining disinterested in political representation. Russian-speaking minorities are also ambivalent toward Kazakh language promotion and anxious about the increasing presence of Kazakhspeakers in urban spaces. This paper argues two factors are central to these stances among Kazakhstan's Russian-speaking minorities: the persistence of Soviet legacies and the effects of state discourse and policy since 1991. 1 The ethnic Russian population was estimated at 3,793,764 in 2009 during the last official population census (the next is planned for 2019). The numbers from stat.gov.kz for 2018 show this has declined to 3,588,686. 2 By 'Russian-speaking minorities' I mean non-titular Russian-speaking (russkoyazichnie) citizens of Kazakhstan whose first language and primary cultural identification is Russian. This avoids using 'Russian' (russkii), which has much historical and contemporary ambiguity. It also does not break the population up into ethnic subgroups (such as 'Ukrainians', 'Russians', 'Jews') in a deterministic and primordialist fashion. Respondents in this study all self-identified as 'Russian' (russkii) or 'Russian-speaking' (russkoyazichnie) and did not claim 'Kazakh' identity. 3 Russian-speakers are trickling out of the country at the rate of a medium-sized town each year. In 2014 around 28,900 emigrated, in 2015 another 30,000 left (Karavan 2016). As for demographic trends, ethnic Kazakh population growth in 2015 was 2.3 percent while the Russian population was shrinking at a rate of 0.51. In terms of average age, in 2013 this was 28.9 for Kazakhs, 38.5 for Russians and 43 for Ukrainians (Laruelle 2016: 71). 4 Consider the stop-start process of promoting Kazakh as the state language, aborted moves to change the name of the country from Kazakhstan to the Kazak Yeli (Kazak Yeli translates roughly as '
Based on more than 100 interviews in European Russia, this article sheds light on the bottom-up dynamics of Russian nationalism. After offering a characterization of the post-2012 “state-civilization” discourse from above, I examine how ordinary people imagine Russia as a “state-civilization.” Interview narratives of inclusion into the nation are found to overlap with state discourse on three main lines: (1) ethno-nationalism is rejected, and Russia is imagined to be a unique, harmonious multi-ethnic space in which the Russians (russkie) lead without repressing the others; (2) Russia’s multinationalism is remembered in myths of peaceful interactions between Russians (russkie) and indigenous ethnic groups (korennyye narodi) across the imperial and Soviet past; (3) Russian culture and language are perceived as the glue that holds together a unified category of nationhood. Interview narratives on exclusion deviate from state discourse in two key areas: attitudes to the North Caucasus reveal the geopolitical-security, post-imperial aspect of the “state-civilization” identity, while stances toward non-Slavic migrants in city spaces reveal a degree of “cultural nationalism” that, while sharing characteristics with those of Western Europe, is also based on Soviet-framed notions of normality. Overall, the article contributes to debates on how Soviet legacies and Russia’s post-imperial consciousness play out in the context of the “pro-Putin consensus.”
This paper examines shared ideas, values and interpretations of the past in the "collective memory" of the 1917 October Revolution. Employing a qualitative approach to examine collective memory "from below," two age cohorts were interviewed in three Russian cities from a variety of social groups in 2014-2015. What was revealed was the existence of a strong positive myth about the pre-revolutionary era of 1900-1914, as well as positive references to the current Putin era. Both eras were "positive" in that Russia was/is a "normal European power," "on the rise economically" and "respected by the other powers." In terms of the definitive national trauma, an overwhelming majority viewed the 1917 October Revolution as a break or rupture in Russian history that caused appalling destruction. This view of 1917 as catastrophic leads to certain key "lessons": that revolutionary change is inherently destructive and wasteful and that external forces had (and have) a vested interest in weakening Russia from without whenever she is at her most vulnerable. Overall, at the heart of myths over 1917 we find a central occupation with the threat of disintegration and a yearning for stability and normality, highlighting how collective memory interacts with political values and social identity.
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