This paper explores the due process of accounting standard-setting by focusing on relative levels of stakeholder and jurisdictional influence. We draw on legitimacy theory to explain our findings and ask what implications any bias might have for the IASB. This study extends the standard-setting literature in three ways. First, we create a weighted coding system to analyse the content of comment letters. Second, we test for differences in the acceptance rate of comments made by stakeholders and by jurisdictions. Third, we analyse IASB discussion documentation that sheds light on the decision-making process. Previous studies have focused on whether outcome-oriented proposals are 'influential' (persuasive) by focusing on success rates measured as proposed changes being accepted. We widen this definition to include whether constituents' views are discussed. We find that accounting firms appear to have significantly less influence than other stakeholders. We also find that the IASB reacts less favourably to UK proposals but comments from the US are more likely to be discussed. A lack of fairness (real or perceived) could jeopardise perceptions of the procedural legitimacy of the due process and ultimately impair the IASB's cognitive legitimacy. Fogarty's (1994) review of the FASB standard-setting process identified a series of constraints, opportunities and dilemmas. The question of whether certain stakeholder groups hold greater levels of (relative) influence has been the subject of much work and researchers have studied this phenomenon in both domestic and international contexts (e.g. McEnroe, 1991, 1998; Kwok and Sharp, 2005; Cortese, Irvine and Kaidonis, 2010). Almost invariably, influence and legitimacy are considered together (Hussein and Ketz, 1991;McEnroe, 1993;Tutticci, Dunstan and Holmes, 1994;Suchman, 1995;Larson, 2002;Chua and Taylor, 2008;Burlaud and Colasse, 2011;Danjou and Walton, 2012). This paper reviews the IASB's standard-setting due process in relation to the complex and This study is motivated, at least in part, by criticisms of, and challenges to, the IASB's procedural legitimacy (e.g. Larson and Herz, 2013;Burlaud and Colasse, 2011; Kwok and Sharp, 2005). This is an important issue within an accounting standard-setting context. Procedural legitimacy is a type of moral legitimacy which can be created (lost), maintained, and built (impaired) according to levels of perceived independence and impartiality (Suchman, 1995). Suchman (1995) distinguishes legitimacy into three primary forms: pragmatic, moral and cognitive.

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Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to address "the existing literature gap on the information content of derivatives reporting". Prior work finds failings in compliance with mandatory reporting requirements in respect of financial instruments and derivative financial instruments. Instead of identifying weaknesses in compliance the paper identifies where firms over-comply or in other words, where firms voluntarily disclose more than they are required and whether this is incremental information or serves another purpose. Design/methodology/approach -The paper reviews the financial instruments disclosures of the FTSE 100 non-financial IFRS 7 compliant firms. Based on these results, on a case-by-case basis the authors address potential causes and rationale for this extra disclosure. Findings -Prior research suggests that it is counter intuitive to argue that firms will provide voluntary disclosure in a mandatory reporting environment because information of this sort tends to be proprietary and competition sensitive, not to mention costly to prepare. However, it is found that firms have voluntarily published information in excess of the requirements and the authors suggest that this extra detail is most commonly associated with a legitimation strategy. Originality/value -In spite of the importance of derivatives usage and management in addition to the increased and often complex reporting requirements, the authors are not aware of any previous study of this type.

The authors review the use of denial through a complex and unstable crisis: the Deepwater Horizon tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico. Denial is typically viewed as a binary response-"we did not do this"-with a binary intended outcome-"and therefore we are not to blame." The authors argue that this interpretation is overly simplistic. They found that Transocean and Halliburton executed a strategy consisting of distancing and (counter)attack to shift blame, whereas BP pursued a strategy dominated by compassion and ingratiation intermixed with carefully used denial to share blame. This form of blame sharing is a hybrid of denial and acceptance. BP accepted responsibility but argued that others were responsible too. The authors' analysis also shows that deny response options were restricted or relaxed dependent on situational and intertextual context. They find that the tone of the involved parties' releases became significantly more aggressive as the situation developed toward its legal conclusion and as they responded to one another's progressively more hostile releases.We examine the use of denial as a crisis response strategy (CRS) in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon (DH) crisis. Denial has many noted benefits for individuals. It can be a form of self-defense (e.g., Levine and Zigler, 1975), impression management

A group of postgraduate accounting and finance students were asked to participate in a three-phase exercise: sit an unseen past examination question; mark a fully anonymised previous student solution (exemplar); and then mark their own work. The marking process was facilitated by explaining and discussing the marking guide, assessment systems and process, and grade descriptors. Levels of marking accuracy significantly improved through the phases of the exercise, demonstrating a calibration of standards. Students' perceptions of the exercise were explored via questionnaires and focus groups. Respondents gave a strong indication that the exercise was useful and identified several learning benefits. The introduction of transparency was found to contribute towards increased stakeholder confidence in the rigour and robustness of assessment systems and processes. It also made participants less cynical about marking veracity and integrity. Another consequence of this increased transparency was that while some concerns were alleviated, others emerged. Through this exercise, students came to understand some of the difficulties assessors face when completing examination setting and marking exercises.

In an extension to the mandatory financial reporting literature, we consider compliance and applicability as intermediate stages in the disclosure decision process, and investigate to what extent these measures explain any variance in the quantity of disclosure. We use financial instruments disclosures as our empirical context because of the level of complexity and diversity of the mandatory requirements. We find that neither applicability nor compliance show statistically significant association with disclosure quantity. By contrast we find that a firm's financial instruments management programme is an important determinant of both applicability and quantity. Finally, we demonstrate the economic consequences of applicability, compliance and quantity through their association with audit fees. For companies that use financial instruments management programmes to a greater extent, audit fees are higher. In contrast, the quantity of financial instruments disclosures appears to reduce audit fees.

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